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CONTRIBUTION OF THE JAINA LOGICIANS TO INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY*

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PART-I

A BRIEF SURVEY OF LITERARY CONTRIBUTION

Before I enter into the problem, I would like to say first of all that the term 'epistemology' encompasses two dimensions of philosophy, i.e. *Jñāna-mīmāṃsā* and *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. To some extent, both the dimensions are intermingled. *Pramāṇa* is not absolutely different from knowledge or cognition. Particularly in Jaina tradition *pramāṇa* is always accepted as a kind of cognition. Hence all the descriptions made in Jaina canons regarding knowledge come under the scope of *pramāṇa*. When we discuss *pramāṇa*, we have to resort to the theory of knowledge. There is only one difference in *pramāṇa* and right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) that the right knowledge depends on right view (*samyag-darśana*), but *pramāṇa* does not require any such right view. *Pramāṇa* is a kind of knowledge which is devoid of doubt (*saṃśaya*), illusion (*viparyaya*) and indetermination (*anadhyavaśāya*). In Jaina philosophy *pramāṇa* has been accepted as a definitive cognition of knowable thing and knowledge itself. The Jaina logicians are almost unanimous on this characteristic of *pramāṇa*. Although at the early time of *Tattvārthasūtra*, there was no difference between *pramāṇa* and right knowledge, that is why, Umāsvāti, the author of *Tattvārthasūtra* had clearly divided five types of knowledge into two kinds of *pramāṇa* without mentioning any difference between right knowledge and *pramāṇa*. He kept *matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge) and *śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding *matijñāna*) under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa* (indirect *pramāṇa*) and the other three types of knowledge i.e. *avadhijñāna* (visual intuition), *manahpariyāya-jñāna* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevalajñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge) had been placed in the category of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*.

* This is a Mahāsatī Tārābai Svāmī lecture given by the author at Chennai.

(perception). This division proves that there was not any difference between right knowledge and *pramāṇa*. *Tattvārthasūtra* is the first work of Jaina system which propounded the right knowledge as *pramāṇa* (an organ of valid cognition) and divided them into two types – *pratyakṣa* and *parokṣa*. This division of *pramāṇa* is based on the process of knowledge. The right knowledge which occurs directly through the soul had been called as *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* (perception) and the right knowledge which occurs through sense organs and quasi-sense had been called as *parokṣa pramāṇa* (other than perception or indirect knowledge).

In Indian Philosophy all the systems other than Jaina, consider that the knowledge acquired through sense organs comes under the category of perception, but the view of earlier Jaina thinkers like Umāsvāti and Pūjyapāda Devanandin who followed the notion of Jaina canonical literature, considered it in the category of *parokṣa*. They explain that the knowledge occurs directly through soul without the help of sense-organs comes under the concept of *pratyakṣa* or direct cognition.

The Jaina logicians, after interaction with other schools, accept the sensuous knowledge under the category of empirical perception or *saṃvṃyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. This development is first seen in the *Vīśeṣā-vaśyakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadraṅgaṇi Kṣamāsramaṇa. He says *jaṃ indiya-maṇobhavaṃ taṃ saṃvavahārapaccakkhaṃ* (*Vīśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya*, 95) which means knowledge occurring through sense organs and quasi-sense is called as *sāṃvṃyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception). Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka and other Jaina logicians followed him. Hence they considered two types of *pratyakṣa* as *mukhya pratyakṣa* and *sāṃvṃyāvahārika pratyakṣa*. The perception occurred directly through the soul comes under the category of *mukhya-pratyakṣa* and the perception occurred through sense-organs and mind comes under the category of *sāṃvṃyāvahārika pratyakṣa* (empirical perception). At this stage, the Jain logicians entered into dialogue with other Indian logicians.

It may be noted that in the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* the word *pramāṇa* is used in the meaning of measurement and we find four types of that *pramāṇa* there i.e. *dravyapramāṇa*, *kṣetrapramāṇa*, *kālapramāṇa* and *bhāvapramāṇa*. Somewhere in the *Bhagavatisūtra* and *Anuyogadvārasūtra* the four types of *pramāṇa* propounded by the Naiyākikas are mentioned i.e. *pratyakṣa* (perception) *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (comparison) and *āgama* (testimony). (*Bhagavatisūtra* 5.3.192)

In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* these four types of *pramāṇa* are mentioned

as the four types of *hetu*— (*Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 245, *Suttāgame*, p. 215). *Sthānāṅgasūtra* has also mentioned three types of *vyavasāya* i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *prātyayika* and *anugāmi*— (*Sthānāṅgasūtra*, 245). Pandit Dalsukha Mālvaṇiya has mentioned in his '*Āgama Yuga kā Jain Darśana*' (pp. 138-139) that these three types of *Vyavasāya* have got a place in Siddhasena's *Nyāyāvatāra* and Haribhadra's *Anekāntajayapatāka* as the developed form of *pramāṇa* i.e. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*. It is true that the seeds and roots of Jain concept of *pramāṇa* are found in Jain canons. The *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Sthānāṅgasūtra* have great importance in this context. In the *Sthānāṅgasūtra* perception is divided into two types i.e. *kevala* and *nokevala*. In the later development of *pramāṇasāstra* the Jain logicians termed these types as *sakala* and *vikala* perception. In the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* and *Nandisūtra* perceptual knowledge is divided into two types i.e. *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *no-indriya pratyakṣa*. This division shows that in the later canonical literature the knowledge occurred by sense organs was included in perception.

This division of perception is not mentioned in the *Tattvārthasūtra*. So it seems that this addition was made in the canons at a later stage. It is possible that Jinabhadraṇin (6th century) developed a concept of *sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa* on the basis of the above mentioned division of perception in the *Nandisūtra* and *Sthānāṅgasūtra*.

Jaina epistemology regarding *pramāṇa* was actually systematized by Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in the eighth century A.D. The main contribution of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka was to establish *smṛti* (recollection) *pratyabhijñāna* (recognition) and *tarka* (inductive reasoning) as independent *pramāṇas* under the category of *parokṣa*. This is also one of the main contributions of Jain epistemology to Indian philosophy.

Before the advent of Akalaṅka (720-780 A.D.), Umāsvāti (2nd-3rd century A.D.), Pūjyapāda Devanandin (5th century A.D.), Samantabhadra (6th century A.D.), Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa (5th century A.D.), Jinabhadraṇi Kṣamā-śramaṇa (6th-7th century A.D.), Siṃhasūri (7th century A.D.) Sumati (7th-8th century) Pātrasvāmī (7th century), Shridatta, Kumāranandin (7th century) and Haribhadrasūri (700-770 A.D.) also contributed their mite to the Jain epistemology to some extent. Ācārya Kundakunda attempted to prove the nature of knowledge illuminating itself and object.

One of the prominent philosophers Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa flourished in the 5th century A.D. discussed all the main philosophical tenets in his famous work *Dvādaśāranayacakra*. He refuted several times the epistemology of other systems. Siṃhasūri's commentary on

it is also an authoritative work for understanding *Dvādaśa-ranayacakra*. Siddhasena Divākara was a great logician who flourished before Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka in 5th century A.D. and wrote an independent work on Jaina logic known as *Nyāyāvatāra*. It is a systematic work comprising 32 *kārikās* (Stanzas) presents a brief description of Jain *pramāṇa-śāstra*. S.C. Vidyābhuṣana mentioned Siddhasena Divākara as a father of Jaina Logic and recognised his *Nyāyāvatāra* as the first work of Jaina Logic (*A History of Indian Logic* p. 173). Hence it is an important work for Jaina Logic. Siddhārṣigaṇi, a philosopher of the 9th century A.D., wrote a comprehensive commentary on it. M.A. Dhaky is of the view that Siddhārṣigaṇi, the commentator of *Nyāyāvatāra*, was himself the writer of *Nyāyāvatāra* (Nirgranth, Ahmedabad, Vol. I), but his opinion does not seem acceptable, because if Siddhārṣigaṇi (9th century) would have written it, then he must have mentioned *smṛiti*, *pratyabhijñāna* and *tarka* as *pramāṇa*, because before the advent of Siddhārṣigaṇi, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka emphatically established them as *pramāṇa*. Śāntisūri of Pūrṇatalagacchiya wrote a *vārttika* and commentary on *Nyāyāvatāra*, which is also an important work for the study of development of Jaina logic. Śāntisūri defined the perception as clarity of knowledge and propounded three types of it i.e. *indriya pratyakṣa* (sensuous perception), *aninindriya pratyakṣa* (quasi-sensuous perception) and *yogaja pratyakṣa*. (*Nyāyāvatāra vārttika*, 17). He defined *vaśādyā* or vividness of knowledge as the apprehension of its content as this (*Nyāyāvatāra-vārttika*, 17) definition has been followed by Hemacandra in his *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* 1.1.14)

Sanmatitarka-prakaraṇa is also an important treatise consisting of three chapters namely—*Naya-mīmāṃsā*, *Jñānamīmāṃsā* and *Jñeya-mīmāṃsā*. Siddhasena was a great philosopher who also contributed to the establishment of the theory of non-absolutism.

Like Siddhasena Divākara, Samantabhadra's main contribution was to establish *Anekāntavāda* or non-absolutism, but occasionally he discussed some concepts of *pramāṇa-śāstra* also. His *Yuktyanuśāsana*, *Āptamīmāṃsā* and *Svayambhūstotra* are the main works.

Sumati, Pātrasvāmī, Śrīdatta and Kumāranandin were such prominent philosophers of the 7th and 8th centuries A.D. whose works are mentioned by Buddhist and Jaina logicians, but the works have not yet been found. Sumati and Pātrasvāmī were such renowned philosophers whose names are referred by the Buddhist logician Śāntarakṣita (8th century) in his work *Tattvasaṃgraha*. Pātrasvāmī's *Trilakṣaṇakadāṛṭhā* was a famous treatise in which the *hetulakṣaṇa*

of Buddhist philosophy was refuted vehemently. Vidyānanda mentioned in *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika* about *Jalpanīmāya* the work of Sṛidatta and in *Pramāṇa-parīkṣā* he mentioned about *Vādanyāya* the work of Kūmāranandin.

In the eighth century A.D. Haribhadra-sūri (700-770 A.D.), an original thinker and profound philosopher, authoured several works. His famous philosophical works are *Anekāntajaya-patākā*, *Śāstravārtā-samuccaya* and *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya*. Commentary of Guṇaratnasūri is famous on *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* and commentary of Yaśovijaya is also renowned on *Śāstravārtā-samuccaya*.

Thus from Umāsvāti down to Haribhadrasūri, the predecessors of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka developed and enriched the Jaina epistemology.

The advent of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka had a great significance from the point of view of systematization of Jain logic and epistemology. He flourished during the period from 720 to 780 A.D. as is upheld by Pandit Mahendra Kumār Nyāyācārya in the introduction to his *Akalaṅkagranthatrayam*. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has critically examined the views regarding metaphysics and epistemology of previous Indian philosophers like Dīnnāga, Dharma Kīrti, Prajñākaragupta, Kaṇvakagomī and Kumārilabhaṭṭa. He authoured two commentaries entitled *Tattvārthavārtika* and *Aṣṭaśatī* on *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti and *Āptamīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra respectively. In the *Tattvārthavārtika* Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka has discussed the definition of *pramāṇa* and accepted that *pramāṇa* (organ of valid cognition) is valid even after it cognises the object previously cognised. He gave an instance of a lamp which illuminates the object even after the moment it is lit. Although the main subject-matter of *Tattvārthasūtra* is not intended to propound epistemology, in the context of description of knowledge commentator Akalaṅka discussed the definitions of *pramāṇa* propounded by other Indian systems also. *Aṣṭaśatī* is a precise commentary having the size of eight hundred *anuṣṭubh* metres. Deep sense, few words and logical acumen are the specialities of Akalaṅka's style and they are more distinct in *Aṣṭaśatī*. Akalaṅka included some new topics in the commentary and threw a light on *pramāṇa-śāstra* explaining the *Kārika* No. 101 of *Āptamīmāṃsā*. He seems impressed by Buddhist definition of *pramāṇa* also, because he used the term '*avisamvāda*' for defining *pramāṇa*. He says that *Pramāṇa* is a kind of cognition devoid of discrepancy and indetermination.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka wrote four independent works viz. *Laghūyastraya* along with the *vṛtti*, *Nyāya-viniścaya* along with the *vṛtti*, *Pramāṇa-saṅgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya* along with the *vṛtti*. All these four works

mainly deal with the epistemology and logic. *Laghūyastraya* is a composite work having three manuals (*prakaraṇa*) viz. (i) *Pramāṇa-praveśa* (ii) *Naya-praveśa* and (iii) *Pravacana-praveśa*. *Pramāṇa-praveśa* contains four chapters on (i) nature of *pramāṇa* (ii) classification (iii) object and (iv) resultant. *Naya-praveśa* is mainly devoted to the description of *Nayas*. *Pravacana-praveśa*, though begins with the definition of *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *nikṣepa*, it mainly deals with *śrutajñāna*, a kind of *parokṣa pramāṇa*.

Nyāyaviniścaya, another work of Akalaṅka, has three chapters on perception, inference and testimony.

Pramāṇa-saṃgrha, an important work of Akalaṅka, deals with every aspect of epistemology in nine chapters. *Siddhiviniścaya* is also an important work regarding epistemology and logic. He defines here *pramāṇa* as *siddhi*. This treatise comprises twelve chapters which are indicative of their subject-matter. Akalaṅka says here that every knowledge is valid due to its corresponding nature and it is invalid due to its discrepancy — *Siddhiviniścaya* 1.19)

If we summarise the contribution of Akalaṅka on the basis of his above mentioned four works, then we can point out his views as follows:

- 1) It was he who for the first time established recollection (*smṛti*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) and inductive reasoning (*tarka*) as *pramāṇa*. He has placed these under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. He has said that if these cognitions are indiscrepant and devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination (*anadhyavasāya*) then these are very much the means of valid cognition.
- 2) He upholds two types of *pratyakṣa-sāṃvayavahārika* (empirical) and *mukhya* (transcendental). The types of *matijñāna* as *avagraha* (receiving), *ihā* (speculation) *avāya* (perceptual judgement) and *dhāraṇā* (retention) were included by him in *sāṃvayavahārika pratyakṣa* and he has accepted their sequential position as propounded in canonical literature.
- 3) He has accepted differences between *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* according to the canonical tradition and has placed the *śrutajñāna* under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*, *śrutajñāna* is known in epistemology as *āgamapramāṇa*.
- 4) He has included *upamāna pramāṇa* (comparison) in the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) of similarity which he conceptualised taking *Samjñā* of Umāsvāti as its basis.
- 5) He has discussed all the epistemological terms, such as *hetu*, *sādhya*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *vyāpti* etc.

- 6) he has introduced some new *hetus* also such as *kāraṇa* (cause) *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara*.
- 7) Akalaṅka has discussed *naya* and *nikṣepa* also which has formed an integral part of epistemology.

The Jaina philosophers contributing to Indian epistemology after Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka are :

Vidyānanda, Anantavīrya, Māṇikyanandin, Vādirāja, Abhayadevasūri, Prabhācandra, Vāddevasūri, Hemacandra, Abhinava dharmabhūṣaṇa, Guṇaratnasūri, Malliṣena, Vimaladāsa and Yaśovijaya. Since it is not possible to discuss the contributions of all these logicians owing to the short time at my disposal, I think it proper to appraise you to the contributions of the prominent logicians.

Vidyānanda (775-840 AD), the first commentator of Akalaṅka, was a profound philosopher deeply acquainted with Jaina and other systems of Indian philosophy. He put forth a step to establish the Jaina *pramāṇa-śāstra* logically. He wrote three commentaries viz. *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika* on *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti, *Aṣṭasahasrī* on *Aṣṭasati* of Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka and *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra* on *yuktyanuśāsana* of Samantabhadra.

In these commentaries he has cogently established the Jaina philosophy and has refuted other systems. *Tattvārtha-śloka-vārtika*, a commentary on the *Tattvārthasūtra*, presents an exhaustive description of Jaina epistemology. He has discussed all the five types of knowledge. He also deals with perception, recollection, (*smaraṇa*), recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*), reasoning (*tarka*), inference (*anumāna*) and testimony (*āgama*). *Aṣṭasahasrī* expounds *Āptanīmāṃsā* of Samantabhadra and *Aṣṭasati* of Akalaṅka on it, but *Aṣṭasahasrī* has become a *kaṣṭasaharī*, because its comprehension is an uphill task. *Yuktyanuśāsanālaṅkāra* is an important work for understanding the Jaina philosophy in general.

Apart from his commentaries Vidyānanda wrote six independent works. viz. *Vidyānandamahodaya*, *Āptaparikṣā*, *Pramāṇaparikṣā*, *Patraparikṣa*, *Satya-śāsana-parikṣā* and *śrīpurapārśvanāthastotra*. All these works are important for the study of Jaina philosophy, particularly his *pramāṇa-parikṣā* is fully devoted to discussing the different aspects of epistemology. Herein Vidyānanta defines *pramāṇa* as right cognition. He repudiated the concept of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* mainly propounded by Buddhists. He says that perception is a kind of valid cognition and every valid cognition is regarded as determinant cognition. Vidyānanda has also discussed the definition of *probans* (*hetu*) and refuted the position of Buddhists and Naiyāyikas who consider

hetu's trairūpya and *pāñcarūpya* respectively as its essential characteristics.

pramāṇa-parīkṣā is really the first composite and systematic work which expalins the complete Jaina epistemology and logic briefly.

The second commmentator of Akalaṅka was Anantavīrya. There are four Anantavīryas referred to in Jaina literature, but he was the third Anantvīrya who flourished during 950 to 990 A.D. and wrote commentaries on *Pramāṇa -saṃgraha* and *Siddhiviniścaya* of Akalaṅka. Commentary on *Pramāṇasaṃgraha* is known as *pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣaya* and commentary on *Siddhiviniścaya* is known as *Siddhiviniścayatīkā*. *pramāṇasaṃgrahabhāṣya* is not yet available, but its reference is found in the *Siddhiviniścayatīkā*. It is an important commentary for understanding the development of Jaina thinking regarding episteniology.

Māṇikyanandin (993-1053 AD) was the first logician who wrote an aphoristic treatise entitled *Parīkṣāmukha* which presents the Jaina system of epistemology in a nutshell. Prabhācandra a prominent philosopher wrote a voluminous commentary on it entitled *prameya-kamala-mārtanḍa*. Laghuanantavīrya's *prameyaratnamālā*, Cārūkīrti's *prameyasatālaṅkāra* and Śāntivarṇi's *Prameyakanṭhikā* are also famous commentaries on *parīkṣāmukha*. All these commentaries depict the importance of this first aphoristic treatise of Jaina logic.

Vādirāja (1025 AD) was also a commentator of Akalaṅka. He wrote a commentary on *Nyāyaviniścaya* of Akalaṅka known as *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa*. This is a big commentary comprising the size of twenty thousand *Anuṣṭubh* stanzas. It discusses the doctrines of several Indian philosophers like Kumārila, Prabhākara, Maṇḍanamīśra, Vyomaśīva, Bhāsarvajña etc. and refutes them cogently. Other work of Vādirāja on Jaina epistemology is *pramāṇa-nirṇaya*. It is an independent work on Jaina-nyāya. Vādirāja propounds only two types of *parokṣa pramāṇa* as inference and testimony and includes recollection, recognition and reasoning as the subdivisions of inference.

Abhayadevasūri the commentator of Siddhasena's *Sanmatitarka prakarana*, was a disciple of Rājagacchiya Pradyumnasūri, Paṇḍit Sukhalala Saṅghavi & Paṇḍit Becaradāsa Dosi have placed him during the second half of the 10th centruy and first half of the 11th century A.D. Pandit Mahendra Kumār Nyāyācārya considers him belonging to the last part of the 11th century of Vikrama Saṃvat, but he does not clearly say that who was earlier between Abhayadevasūri and Prabhācandra. It seems that Abhayadevasūri's commentary on

Sanmatitarka was written eariler than the works of Prabhācandra becuase the issues raised in the *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* (*ṭikā* on *Sanmatitarka*) are found more systematic in the works of Prabhācandra.

The commentary *Sanmatitarkaṭikā* also known as *Tattvabodhavidhāyini* and *Vādamahārṇava* explains *naya*, *jñāna* and *jñeya* at lenght. Abhayadevasūri was a well-versed commentator on Jaina epistemology. He has a penetrating view when he refutes the other systems. The second *kāṇḍa* of his commentary mainly deals with epistemology.

Prabhācandra, a renowned Jaina logician, has contributed a lot by writing two voluminous commentaries entitled *Nyāya-kumudacandra* and *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa*. *prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* is a commentary on *Parikṣāmukha* of Māṇikyanandin and *Nyāya-kumudacandra* is a commentary on *Laghiyastraya* of Akalaṅka. Pandit Kailasacandra Śāstrī places him during 950 to 1020 AD in the introduction to the first part of *Nyāya-kumudacandra* and Pandit Mahendra Kumar Nyāyācārya has fixed him with a minor modification during 980 to 1065 A.D. Prabhācandra has given many new cogent arguments to refute the other systemes and to establish the Jaina philosophy. He has discussed the other systems' *prima facie* views (*pūrvapakṣa*) and refuted them on logical ground. Although he is credited to have written some other works like *Tattvārthavṛtti*, *Śākaṭāyananyāsa*, *Śabdāmbhojabhāskara*, *Pravacana-sārasarojābhāskara*, *Gadyakathakośa*, *Mahāpurāṇa ṭippana*, *Ratnākaraṇḍaṭika*, *Samādhitantraṭika*, *Kriyākalāpaṭika*, and *Ātmānuśāsanaṭilaka*, but scholars have divergent opinions about the authourship of some of these works.

Although *Prameya-kamala-mārtaṇḍa* comes under the category of a commentary, but it seems to be an independent original work. Prabhācandra has also discussed all the other systems in detail and has subjected them to devastating criticism.

In his other commentary *Nyāya-kumudacandra*, Prabhacandra discussed some new topics and presented new arguments to establish the Jaina theory of epistemology. There is no doubt that he has explained all the aspects of *pramāṇa* in a systematic and logical style in both the commentaries.

Like Māṇikyanandin, a Digamber sect, Vādidēvasūri was the first Śvetāmbara Ācārya who wrote an aphoristic treatise on Jaina logic entitled *Parikṣāmukha*, but somewhere or other Vādidēvasūri differs from Māṇikyanandin as on the topics of *kevalī-kavalā-hāra*,

emancipation of a woman etc. Vādidevasūri's *pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* comprises eight chapters having two more chapters than *parīkṣāmukha*, dealing with *naya* and *vāda* also. Vādidevasūri was the first logician who systematized the rules of *vāda* according to Jain views. Another new chapter which deals with *naya* is also important, because it summarises the Jain perspective on *naya*. A profound philosopher of the 17th century, a celebrated Jain philosopher Ācārya Yaśovijaya, has followed his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* in his Jain *Tarka-Bhāṣā*. Vādidevasūri himself wrote a valuable commentary as *syād-vāda-ratnākara*. It is a voluminous commentary having a size of eighty four thousand *Anustubh* metres. The title *syādvāda-ratnākara* is significant by its subject-matter. Vādidevasūri discussed those topics too which could not be taken up by Prabhācandra. The language of the work is very lucid and attractive. *Syādvādaratnākara* is of paramount importance since it goes one step further in developing Jain epistemological doctrines. He was the first and the last commentator in the Jain sects who wrote such a big and authoritative commentary on Jain epistemology. He dealt with all the philosophical aspects. He cogently proved the validity of *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara*, *sahacara* and *vyāpya hetu*s and coined the two new terms *tiryak sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā sāmānya* in the context of *pratyabhijñāna* and *prameya*.

Hemacandrasūri, known as *Kalikālasarvajña*, was not only a logician, but also a poet, rhetorician, grammarian, lexicographer etc. His unique work *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* has established him as an original thinker in the field of epistemology. He defines *pramāṇa* as an authentic definitive cognition of an object. He does not feel any necessity of inserting 'sva' in the definition of *pramāṇa*, because in the opinion of Hemacandra '*Svanirṇaya*' does not distinguish it from illusory cognition. Prior to Hemacandra *pramāṇa* was defined as *sva-para-vyavasāyī*, *svaparāvabhāṣaka* etc. which means *pramāṇa* is a definitive cognition of an object and of the self. Thus Hemacandra has his own views whereas Māṇikyamandin inserted word *apūrva* in the definition of *pramāṇa*.

Hemacandra repudiates his insertion and says that a cognition taking note of an object previously cognised does not lack the status of *pramāṇa* exactly as the cognition which takes note of what is to be cognised in future. He proposes that with the point of view of modes cognition of previously cognised object is not possible, because a substance is changing every moment at the angle of its modes.

Jīneśvarasūri's *Pramālakṣaṇa* (10th-11th centuries A.D.) Candrasenasūri's *Utpādādisiddhi*, Abhinavadharmabhūṣaṇa's

Nyāyadīpikā, Narendrasena's *Pramāṇa-prameya-kalikā* are also important works which have enriched the Jaina epistemological literature.

In the seventeenth century Ācārya Yaśovijaya (emerged as a prominent philosopher) wrote more than a hundred works. His works mainly related to Jaina epistemology are—*Jainatarkabhāṣā*, *Jñānabindu*, *Aṣṭasahasrītātparyavivaraṇa* and *Śāstravārtāsamuccayaṭīkā*.. Among these works former two are independent treatises and the latter two are the commentaries. *Aṣṭasahasrītātparyavivaraṇa* is a commentary on *Aṣṭasahasrī* of Vidyānanda and *Śāstravārtāsamuccayaṭīkā* is a commentary on *Śāstravārtāsamuccaya* of Haribhadrāsūri.

To conclude, we can say that the Jaina epistemology has completed a long journey of development ranging from the 2nd century A.D. to the 17th century A.D. It has been enriched by a huge literature comprising aphoristic treatises, commentaries, *vārttikas*, *bhāṣyas* and independent works. It goes without saying that both from the point of view of volume of literature and quality of philosophical discussion it is not less advanced, (if not more), than the Vedic logic and Buddhist logic. Some points are noted below :

- A. The Jaina philosophers of both the sects Digambara and Svetambara joined their hands to develop the Jaina epistemology and logic. Jain philosophers were well-versed with all the systems of philosophy, whatever they thought appropriate for Jaina system was accepted. Their refutation of opponent's view is based on cogent reasons.
- B. If the works of Sumati, Kumāranandin and Pātrakeśari are found available, then the history of the development of Jaina epistemology may be rewritten.
- C. Ūmāsvāti was the first philosopher who recognised right knowledge as *pramāṇa* and classified the *pramāṇa* into two types i.e. *pratyakṣa* (perception) and *parokṣa*. After establishment of right knowledge as *pramāṇa* all the descriptions of knowledge found in canonical literature came under the category of *pramāṇa*.
- D. The division of knowledge as *indriya-pratyakṣa* and *no-indriya-pratyakṣa* as found in the *Nandī-sūtra* seems a latter development.
- E. Although *Nyāyāvatāra* is the first systematic work on Jaina epistemology and logic, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka systematized it. He

included recollection, recognition and reasoning as *pramāṇa* under the category of *parokṣa pramāṇa*. He introduced *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara hetus* as valid probans.

- F. The knowledge occurring through sense organs was first included as empirical perception (*sāṃvya vahārika pratyakṣa*) by Jinabhadraṇin. Earlier it was mentioned as *indriya-pratyakṣa* in the *Nandisūtra*. In the *Nandi-sūtra* the concept of *anindriya pratyakṣa* (quasisense) is not mentioned. The *Nandisūtra* mentions about *no-indriya pratyakṣa*, but this term was used to denote transcendental perception.
- G. The *mukhya pratyakṣa* was given a new name as *pāramārthika pratyakṣa* by Vādidevasūri. He further divided it into two types as *sakala* and *vikala pratyakṣa* on the basis of a division found in the *Sthānāṅga-sūtra* as *kevala* and *no-kevala*.
- H. The Svetāmbara logicians are unanimous in accepting the validity of cognition which cognises the object previously cognised. Whereas Digambara logicians like Akalanika, Māṇikyanandin and Prabhācandra were of opinion that it is a condition for valid cognition to be regarded as a *pramāṇa* that it must cognise the object which is previously not cognised.
- I. Hemacandra for the first time mentions that mind is capable to know all the objects. Umāsvāti says that mind is only an instrument of *Śrutajñāna*.

We cannot forget the scholars of the 20th century like Paṇḍita Sukhlal Sanghavi, Dalsukha Bhai Mālavanīyā, Mahendra Kumāra Nyayacarya, Satakari Mookerjee, Becardāsa Dosi, Darbārīlala Koti and Nathamal Tāṭia who have contributed to bring out the literature with their perfection of editing and illustrative notes. Some of Jaina Saints and scholars are also engaged in translating the epistemological works in Hindi, Gujarati and English. Paṇḍit Kailāsa Candra Śāstrī, Nagin J. Śāha, and Muni Nathamala (Ācārya Mahāprajña) and are such modern scholars who also contributed to present the Jaina views in a critical manner. The Jaina epistemological literature is undoubtedly of paramount importance for understanding the development of Indian and Jaina thinking on epistemology.

PART II

AN APPRAISAL OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DOCTRINES

As pointed out before the term 'epistemology' encompasses two dimensions of philosophy i.e. *Jñāna-mīmāṃsā* and *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*. Today I want to make it clear that *Nayamīmāṃsā* is also a dimension of epistemology which has been discussed exclusively by Jaina philosophers. Epistemology is a science of knowledge which includes all that deals with every aspect of knowing. *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* and *Nayamīmāṃsā* are not absolutely different from *Jñānamīmāṃsā*. The *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti propounds clearly that knowledge of an object is attained by *pramāṇa* and *naya*. (*Tattvārthasūtra* 1.6). Herein it is also clear that *Adhigama* (knowledge) is a resultant and *pramāṇa* and *naya* are the means. *pramāṇa* and *jñāna* are the terms which are commonly found in all the systems of Indian philosophy. But the characteristic concept of '*naya*' is a peculiar contribution of Jaina system of Indian epistemology. The Jaina logicians contributed their mite to establish the doctrine of *naya*. Although '*naya*' is a part of *śrutajñāna*, it has been developed by the Jaina logicians as a separate branch of knowledge which denotes the different attitudes and standpoints. Another contribution of the Jaina logicians is the development of the theory of *Anekāntavāda* (non-absolutism) and *Syādvāda*. *Saptabhaṅgi naya* (sevenfold predication) is also a development of non-absolutism. Thus the Jaina contribution to Indian epistemology is significant for knowing a truth with different perspectives. The fivefold knowledge i.e. *matijñāna* (sensuous knowledge), *śrutajñāna* (scriptural or verbal knowledge, succeeding *matijñāna*), *avadhijñāna* (visual intuition), *manahparyāya jñāna* (intuition of mental modes) and *kevala-jñāna* (pure and perfect knowledge) is an original contribution of Jaina tradition which was manitained by the Jaina logicians by including it in the twofold *pramāṇa*.

Now I want to highlight the points on which Jaina logicians contributed to the Indian epistemology regarding *pramāṇa*. The main contributions of the Jaina logicians regarding *pramāṇa* are as follows:

- (i) Definition of *pramāṇa* and its nature illuminating the self and the object.
- (ii) Establishment of recollection (*smṛti*) as an independent *pramāṇa*.
- (iii) Establishment of recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*) as an independent *pramāṇa*.

- (iv) Establishment of inductive reasoning (*tarka*) as an independent *pramāṇa*.
- (v) Definition of probans (*hetu*) as incompatibility with the contradictory (*anyathānupapatti*).
- (vi) Establishment of new probans such as *kāraṇa*, *pūrvacara*, *uttaracara* and *sahacara*
- (vii) Particular view about the members of *parārthānumāna* required (for inference for others).
- (viii) Nature of *prameya* (object) is *Dravyaparyāyātma* or *Sāmānyaviśeṣātma*.

Now we shall discuss the above arguments and clarify the thoughts of the Jaina logicians about these points.

i. Definition of *Pramāṇa*

Regarding the definition of *Pramāṇa* Jaina philosophers are unanimous in propounding it as definitive cognition. The other characteristic of *pramāṇa* accepted by them is the nature of *pramāṇa* illuminating the self and the object. The Jaina logicians uphold that the contact of the sense organ and object never can be a *pramāṇa*. They say that like object, the sense-object contact also cannot be a pre-eminent cause in generating valid knowledge, because both of them are non-revelatory, because Jaina thinkers propound that *pramāṇa* is useful for accepting the desired object and abandoning the undesirable one. Hence it must be cognition. They also accept that a valid cognition through a *pramāṇa* does not require to prove its validity, because the knowledge is always of the nature of illuminating the self and the object. They give an example of the Sun or a lamp which illuminates itself and the object. It is true in our experience also that we know what we know. The Naiyāyikas accept that a cognition can illuminate only its object and *vijñānavādins* say that a knowledge always illuminates the self. The Jaina logicians clearly accept that knowledge is possessed of both the qualities in its nature. About its nature of determinate the Jaina logicians are firmly determined. Hence, they have refuted the Buddhist definition of *pratyakṣa* which is devoid of determination, because they accept the *pratyakṣa* as *nirvikalpaka* (non-propositional).

ii. Establishment of recollection (*smṛti*) as *Pramāṇa* :

Recollection is a knowledge which arises after the stimulation of memory-impression and is expressed by the pronoun 'that' (*tad.*) Manifestation of recollection is necessarily conditioned by stimulation of memory impression. Hemcandra defines recollection as such.

vāsanod-bodha-hetukā tad ityākāra smṛti. (Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā .1.2.3) Almost all the philosophers from Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka down to Vāḍidevasūri define recollection almost in the same manner. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka says that recollection is a resultant of retention, but it is also a *pramāṇa*, because of its resultant recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*).

Although *Prasastapāda* has mentioned recollection as a kind of *vidyā* (right knowledge), but he did not accept it as an independent *pramāṇa*. *Nyāyasūtra* mentions it as an attribute of soul. But none other system than Jaina has accepted it as an independent. The *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* philosophy does not consider it as *pramāṇa*, because it cognises the object previously cognised, and *pramāṇa* in their opinion always cognises the object previously not cognised. Buddhist philosophers also give the same argument, but they present some more arguments, such as (i) it is not generated by an object, so it does not correspond to the object, (ii) if recollection is considered as *pramāṇa* then intention, repugnance (*dveṣa*) etc. will also be considered as *pramāṇa* and it will create an infinite regress, (iii) recollection deals with past object. But in view of the Jaina logicians, Buddhist view is not accurate.

The Jaina logicians Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra and Vāḍidevasūri put forth many cogent arguments to establish it as an independent *pramāṇa*. Some of them are presented here.

1. Recollection is an organ of valid cognition, because it is an indiscrepant cognition. Whenever the recollection is found discrepant then it comes under the psuedo-organ of valid condition. The recollection which is corresponding to activity is an indiscrepant knowledge.
2. If recollection is not regarded as a separate organ of valid condition, because it cognises the object previously cognised, then it is not a valid reason, because the recollection also cognises partly unknown from the point of view of time etc.
3. Inference cannot be an organ of valid cognition without having recourse to recollection of invariable concomitance. Every philosopher who accepts inference as a means of valid cognition has to invariably resort to recollection of invariable concomitance. For example, when we perceive smoke on a mountain the impression of our previous cognition of smoke pervaded by fire in kitchen is awakened and we recollect it immediately.
4. Vidyānanda says that without accepting the validity of recollection, the validity of recognition does not exist. If recollection is not valid then inductive reasoning cannot take

place. Without the help of valid inductive reasoning the inference cannot occur. If inference does not take place then validity of perception can not be proved. In this way, in absence of all the *pramāṇas* object cannot be proved. Thus if we do not accept the validity of recollection all the organs of knowledge and the knowable things will not exist in the world of reality.

5. Recollection is a valid organ of cognition because it is a means of knowledge like a perception. The intelligent people cannot behave without the validity of recollection. If we do not accept its validity then we cannot even reach our homes. All the transaction of money will be stopped. The students will not be able to write any thing in their answer sheets at the time of examination. Thus the validity of recollection is duly established in all our activities.
6. If recollection is understood as invalid cognition on account of its occurrence after perception then it is also not legitimate because inference also occurs after perception.
7. As inference is a valid organ of cognition because it is devoid of doubt, illusion and indetermination, so is the recollection, because it also has the same quality.
8. Without the memory of probans (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*) the invariable relation between them cannot be established.
9. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* says that recollection is not invalid because it cognises the object previously cognised, but it is invalid because it is not generated by the object, because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness.

na smṛter apramāṇatvaṃ grhīta-grāhītā-kṛtam ।

api-tvānārtha-janyatvaṃ tad aprāmāṇya-kāraṇam ॥

The reason of the invalidity of recognition pointed out in this *Karikā* is also corresponding to the Buddhist view, but it is not proper according to Vidyānanda. He replies as under.

nārthāḥ janmopapadyeta pratyakṣasya smṛteriva ।

tadvat sa eva tadbhāvād anyathā na kṣaṇa-kṣayaḥ ॥

Tattvārtha-śloka-vārttika. (1.13.27)

The reply is given to the Buddhist philosophers that in the Buddhist view even the perception also, is not generated from the object because the object does not exist at the time of correspondence due to its momentariness. Prabhācandra replies in a different way that we the Jains do not accept the perception generated from the object. It is true that in Jaina philosophy the knowledge is a result of subsidence-

cum-destruction of the *karma* obscuring knowledge. Ācārya Hemcandra gives a different argument that recollection is a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object, such as *yogijñāna* is a valid organ of cognition without its emergence from an object.

iii. Establishment of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) as *pramāṇa*

Another contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the establishment of recognition *pratyabhijñāna* as an independent organ of cognition. According to the Jaina logicians recognition is the synthetic judgement born of observation and recollection. Akalaṅka has used the term *Samjñā*, *Samjñāna* and *pratyabhijñāna* for recognition. The Jaina philosophers have included the comparison (*upamāna*) under recognition as one of its kinds. They did not accept comparison as a separate organ of valid cognition. The Jaina logician Vidyānanda propounded two types of recognition i.e. knowledge of oneness (*ekatvajñāna*) and knowledge of similarity (*sādṛśya jñāna*).

When the object already perceived and recollected is the same at the time of recognition, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of oneness and when the object is similar to the object being perceived and recollected, the recognition is in the form of knowledge of similarity. *tadevaṃ ityekatva-nibandhanaṃ tādṛśam evedaṃ iti. sādṛśya-nibandha* (*Pramāṇa-parikṣanamp.42*). He is the same Devadatta so 'yaṃ devadattaḥ is the example of knowledge of oneness and as an ox so the *gavaya go-sadṛso gavayaḥ* is the example of knowledge of similarity.

Māṇikyanandin, a profound scholar of Jaina epistemology, goes a step further and recognises recognition on its various aspects. He says the recognition can be manifold. Some examples are: it is identical with that, it is similar to that, it is different from that, it is relatum to that. *tad evedaṃ tat-sadṛśam, tadvilakṣaṇam, tat-pratīyogityādi* (*Parikṣāmukha 3.5*) former two types of recognition have already been mentioned above. A buffalo is different from the cow is the example of *tad-vilakṣaṇatva* and 'this is away from that' 'this is near to that', are the examples of (*tat pratīyogitva*). Ācārya Hemcandra corroborates the kinds proposed by Māṇikyanandin.

Vāddevasūri, the author of *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvāloka* and *Syādvādaratnākara* used the new terms of *tīryak sāmānya* and *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya* relating to the definition of recognition. *Tīryak sāmānya* and he is the same Devadutta denotes *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*. In Indian philosophy Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta and Kāśmīra Śaivism also discuss the recognition, but they include it in perception and do not recognise it as a separate organ of valid cognition.

Jayantabhaṭṭa, a foremost Naiyāyika, accepts the validity of recognition under perception, because it is generated by sense object contact with the help of latent trace (*saṃskāra*). But the Buddhist logicians are of the opinion that recognition cannot be *pramāṇa*, because of infinite regress, illusory knowledge having no object and uncorresponding nature of it. For establishment of recognition as independent valid organ of cognition the Jaina logicians have given many arguments the main arguments are being presented here.

1. Recognition is neither merely a recollection nor merely a perception, but it is different from both and is possessed of being a new *pramāṇa*, because it has to cognise a different object which is not cognised by mere perception and mere recollection. So recognition is an independent organ of cognition.
2. It is a *pramāṇa*, because it is found indiscrepant in behaviour. Ācārya Hemacandra says that without accepting the recognition as independent *pramāṇa* (valid organ of cognition) the logical justification of bondage and emancipation would become absolutely impossible. If it is the self same person who suffers bondage and achieves liberation, it is possible that the person can try to achieve the joy of freedom.
3. Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka maintains the sequence of recollection, recognition and inductive reasoning is the resultant of recognition. He tells that the meaning of a word can be known only if the validity of recollection is accepted.
4. Perception is not capable to differentiate between distant and near, short and long etc., only recognition can do so.
5. Vidyānanda says that without the acceptance of recognition we cannot know that I am the same who was child, teenager, young, and adult before and now have become an old man. (*Tattvārthaślokaṭīkā*, 1.13.46). He says that without accepting its validity of recognition Buddhists would not be able to consider the oneness between two momentary objects or *svalakṣaṇa*. It is necessary to accept the validity of recognition for the knowledge of similarity also.
6. Recognition is different from inference because it recognises the *hetu* (probans) only and inference is a later process.
7. The object of recognition is not cognised by recollection and perception separately, hence it cognises the object which is not cognised by any other *pramāṇa*.
8. There is no contradictory cognition which affects its validity.

Thus the Jaina logicians have established the recognition as an

independent *pramāṇa*. It is to be noted that they include *upamāna* (comparison) in the category of the knowledge of similarity under recognition.

iv. Establishment of inductive reasoning (*tarka*) as *pramāṇa*

It is also a significant contribution of the Jaina logicians that they established the *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa*. They propound that invariable relation between probans (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*) can be known only by *Tarka pramāṇa*. *Tarka* of inductive reasoning expresses the universal necessary concomitance between probans and probandum. Hemacandra says Inductive reasoning is the knowledge of universal concomitance conditioned by observation and non-observation (*Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*, 1.2.4).

In the *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama *tarka* (reasoning) has been used for indicating inference or *Arthāpatti* (presumptive cognition). It is only the Jaina logicians who considered *tarka* as a knowledge of universal concomitance. Akalaṅka, Vidyānanda, Prabhācandra, Vāḍidevasūri and Hemacandra are the logicians who advanced cogent arguments for the establishment of *tarka* as an independent *pramāṇa*.

The main arguments are :

1. The object which is cognised by *tarka* is not cognised by any other *pramāṇa*. *Tark* is a knowledge of universal concomitance. No other *pramāṇa* can do so, neither perception nor inference.
2. The validity of inference depends on *tarka*, because it is a knowledge of necessary concomitance and without the knowledge of necessary concomitance inference cannot arise.
3. It has a corresponding nature.
4. It is not conceivable that perception is competent to discharge the entire series of operations that are involved in the knowledge that whatever is a case of smoke is invariable the product exclusively of fire in all places and times, and not of anything else. The reason that it is not discursive and owes its genesis to the inference exerted by a datum that is present,
5. If Inference is competent to know the necessary-concomitance then it will result in infinite regress, because an inference will require another inference.

Thus the Jaina logicians have established *tarka* as independent *pramāṇa* by presenting cogent arguments. This shows their intensive thinking about the system of epistemology and logic.

v. Definition of probans (hetu)

One important contribution of the Jaina logicians to Indian epistemology is the definition of reason or probans (*hetu*). Probans is a necessary means for the occurrence of inference. Inference is the knowledge of probandum on the strength of probans. All the Indian philosophers who accept inference as an organ of valid cognition, unanimously agree that probandum (*sādhya*) can be known by probans (*sādhana, hetu*) as in the case of probandum fire on mountain can be known by probans smoke. But on the definition of probans the Indian philosophers have divergent views. The Buddhist philosophers propound three characteristics of a valid probans, viz-its subsistence in the subject (*pakṣa-dharmatva*), its subsistence in the homologue (*sapakṣa-sattva*) and the absence of the same in a heterologue (*vipakṣasattva*). These three characteristics of probans are also mentioned in the *Prāsaṅgikābhāṣya* of Vaiśeṣika philosophy. But the Nyāya philosophy admitted two new characteristics apart from the above three which are : the absence of contradiction of the probandum (*abādhitaviśayatva*) and the absence of a countervailing probans (*asat-pratipakṣatva*). The Jaina logicians have given a new idea about the characteristics of probans that it bears only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility (*anyathānupapatti or avinābhāva*) of the one in the absence of the other. Probans cannot exist in the absence of probandum. This is the only characteristic of probans; for example, smoke a proban cannot exist in the absence of a probandum fire.

The Jaina philosophers have refuted the notion of *trairūpya* (triple characteristics) and *pāñca-rūpya* (five characteristics) of probans maintained by Buddhists and Naiyāyikas respectively. The Jaina philosophers right from Siddhasena down to Yaśovijaya have indifferently propounded that a probans has only one characteristic and that is the certainty of logical impossibility of that (probans) in the absence of probandum. It is having the sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum. Pātrasvāmī was profound logician who wrote a separate book *Trilakṣaṇakadarthana* to refute the Buddhist view. Its reference is found in *Tattvasaṃgrha*, a work of Śāntarakṣita, the Buddhist logician. Śāntarakṣita has criticised the view of Pātrasvāmī, but the Jaina logicians have firmly defended their views. The main arguments of the Jaina philosophers are as follows :

1. The sole and solitary characteristic of standing in necessary concomitance with the probandum is sufficient for defining probans. Three or five characteristics are not required for a valid

probans. There are some *hetus* possessed of three characteristics, but devoid of validity, e.g.

*sa śyāmas tasya patratvād dṛṣṭā śyamā yathetare/
iti tri-lakṣaṇo hetur na niścityai pravartate //*

Tattva-saṃgraha 1369

sa śyāmaḥ tat-putratvād tarayāḥ anyaputratvāt (Pramāṇa-parikṣā p.45). He must be swarthy in complexion since he is the son of Maitreyī (a woman of swarthy complexion). It is an instance of a defective probans, because it is not necessary that every son of Maitreyī will be swarthy in complexion. So in the absence of necessary factor of universal concomitance the three characteristics are useless.

2. There are many *hetus* which are not possessed of triple characteristics but they are competent, because of having a unitary characteristic of necessary concomitance with the probandum; for example, tomorrow will be Thursday because today is Wednesday, Śakata constellation will arise after a *muhūrta*, because the *kṛttika* constellation has just arisen, are such *hetus* which do not have triple characteristics (*Trirūpata*), but competent enough for the inferential cognition of a probandum. The only one characteristic of *Anyathānupapatti* is needed to define a probans Pātrakeśari says-

*anyathā-nupapannattaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim |
nānyathā-nupapannattaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim ||*

Tattva-saṃgraha 1368.

Vidyānanda gives two arguments to prove the illegitimacy of triple characteristics of probans as under

- (i) It is found in fallacious probans also.
- (ii) It is not a differentia to distinguish a probans from a pseudo-probans.

Ācārya Hemacandra says that refutation of *trairūpya* will also serve as a refutation of the *pañcarūpya*, since this is nothing but an elaboration of universal concomitance.

Thus it is a new perspective of Jaina logic which speaks of the deep and penetrative thinking of Jaina logicians.

VI. Establishment of new probans (such as *kāraṇa* etc)

The Jaina logicians propounded four new probans also, namely *kāraṇa* (cause), *pūrvacara*, (predecessor), *uttaracara* (successor), *sahacara* (simultaneous). These kinds of probans have not been

accepted by other Indian systems. The Jaina logicians propose so many examples of these *hetus* as means of inference. There would be rain, since a particular type of clouds are seen' is an example of *kāraṇa hetu*. 'Śakata constellation would rise because otherwise the rise of *kṛttika* would not have been there' is an example of *pūrvacara hetu*. Here, after the rise of *kṛttika* the rise of the *śakata* takes place immediately after it, without exception, and therefore, the *kṛttika* indicates the rise of the *śakata* as its predecessor reason. 'Bharani rose before, because *kṛttika* is rising' is an example of *uttaracara hetu*. Here the rise of *kṛttika*, which succeeds the rise of *Bharani* indicates it. These two *pūrvacara* and *uttaracara* are different from the cause and effect as they are mediated by the obstacle of time. The fruit of mango should be possessed of a colour because the fact of being possessed of taste cannot be justified otherwise. Here taste which is always simultaneous with the colour being not justified in its absence, indicates it. All these *hetus* are valid because of their invariable concomitance with their probandum.

Ācārya Māṇikyanandin clarifies that there are two types of *avinābhāva-saha-avinābhāva* and *krama-avinābhāva*. *Kāraṇa*, *kārya*, *pūrvacara* and *uttaracara hetus* are found valid because of their *kramavinābhāva* and *sahacara hetu* is found valid because of its *saha-avinābhāva*. In this way the concept of *vyāpatih* has also been developed by the Jaina logicians. It shows their logical acumen.

Right from Akalaṅka down to Vaśovijaya almost all the Jaina logicians have accepted the validity of aforesaid four new *hetus*.

Philosophers of other systems do not consider a cause as *hetu*, because cause is possible even without its effect, therefore it is not an indicator of the effect. The Jaina logicians reply this question that where it is possible to ascertain that all other causes are also co-operating and there is no hindrance in its capability, then alone the cause can be the indicator of effect. We can give examples to support their thinking as—milk is sweet, because sugar has been added to it, balloon will fly up because hydrogen gas has been filled up. If cause is capable to make an effect and it is devoid of hindrance then it may be a valid *hetu*, but in the respect of definition of *hetu* as propounded by the Jaina logicians that *hetu* never remains in the absence of effect, but *kāraṇa* (cause) *hetu* remains even in the absence of effect, so here it contradicts the definition of *hetu* propounded by the Jaina logicians. In *pūrvacara hetu* also the same situation has happened. When a sequence of some incidences is definitive then *pūrvacara & uttaracara hetus* are useful for a common man. *Sahacara hetu* is also common

in our daily life. For example : back part of a wall is inferred by perceiving front part of it.

It seems that the Jaina logicians have accepted these *hetus*, because of their corresponding nature in behaviour.

Regarding the member of *parārthānumāna*, the Jaina logicians have propounded that *pakṣa-vacana* (the statement of the thesis) and *hetu* (probans) these two members are sufficient for an inference for others (*parārthānumāna*), but for the dull minded persons they have accepted five members also.

To conclude we can say that the Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to Indian epistemology in many ways. They discussed about every aspect of Indian epistemology and logic. It seems that they have a deep study of other systems also. It is noteworthy that they developed the epistemology regarding *pramāṇa* upholding the canonical views, but they have given due significance to the empirical view also.

Hence the Jaina epistemological literature is of paramount importance for the understanding of the epistemological thinking of other systems also, because the Jaina philosophers have presented their opponents' views honestly and systematically.

The Jaina logicians have contributed their mite to epistemological doctrines which can be summed up as follows :

- A. They established the nature of *pramāṇa* illuminating itself and the object.
- B. They cogently established recollection, recognition, and inductive reasoning as independent *pramāṇas*.
- c. They are very precise in defining the *hetu*, but they have elaborately conceived kinds and sub-kinds of *hetus*.

Their view of non-absolutism helped them in developing the epistemological doctrines and they formed many new technical terms such as: *sāmvyavahārika pratyakṣa*, *tiryak sāmānya*, *ūrdhvatā-sāmānya*, *saha-avinābhāva*, *krama-avinābhāva* etc. They enrich the literature on *Naya* and *Nikṣepa* also which are mentioned in canons for understanding a proper meaning of a word.

LORD MAHĀVĪRA ON PRAMĀDA

Colonel D.S. BAYA SHREYAS (Retd)

When asked by his principal disciple, Gaṇadhara Gautama, as to how an individual ought to walk, stand, sit, lie-down, eat-drink, and speak, so as not to incur sin,¹ Lord Mahāvīra replied that an individual who walks, stands, sits, lies-down, eats-drinks and speaks carefully does not incur sin.²

What is Pramāda ?

The English equivalents of the word '*pramāda*' are :

- A. Carelessness,
- B. Idleness,
- C. Indiscretion,
- D. Negligence,
- E. Non-vigilance, and
- F. Remissness.

Accordingly, *Pramāda* can be defined in two parts—firstly, neglecting to do what one is required to do (or one's duty) due to idleness or sloth; and secondly, doing what one does carelessly, indiscreetly, negligently, without exercising due vigilance, or with undue remiss.

Lord Mahāvīra's answer to Gaṇadhara Gautama's question lays down a premise for the conduct of spiritual practitioners or *sādhakas*. The premise is *jayaṇā* i.e. care vigilance or non-negligence. Thus *jayaṇā* is the opposite of *pramāda*, and when the Lord lays down the observance of *jayaṇā* in each and every action of the *sādhaka*. He also, by the law of reverses, lays down the avoidance of *pramāda*.

Another facet of *pramāda* is idleness, inaction or neglecting to do what is essential in the pursuit of one's ultimate goal, which is nothing but spiritual salvation or *nirvāṇa*. Again, by the law of reverses, it means doing what ought not to be done.

1. *kaḥaṃ care, kaḥaṃ ciṭṭhe, kaḥamāse, kaḥaṃ saye I
kaḥaṃ bhuñjanto, bhāsanto, pāvaṃ kammaṃ na bandhai ? II*
Daśavaikālikasūtra, 4/7.
2. *jayaṃ care, jayaṃ ciṭṭhe, jayamāse, jayaṃ saye I
jayaṃ bhuñjanto, bhāsanto, pāvaṃ kammaṃ na bandhai II*
Ibid, 4/8.

The Lord had all along, in His preachings, laid the most stress on this one aspect of the *sādhaka's* conduct. In the tenth chapter of the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra* are contained as many as thirtysix reasons, each addressed to Gaṇadhara Gautama, as to why *pramāda*, or the neglect of desirable action, ought to be avoided even for a *samaya* or the millionth part of a second. As believers of the faith, it will be worthwhile to ponder over a few of these reasons—

1. The human life is like a ripe, withered, yellowed tree-leaf, that may fall at any time—meaning that the death may come at any time. Hence, O Gautama ! avoid *pramāda* even for a *samaya*.³
2. The human life is like a dew-drop at the tip of a blade of grass, that may dry up at the break of dawn or may fall to the ground at any time. Hence, O Gautama ! do not succumb to *pramāda* even for a millionth part of a second.⁴
3. Short as the life-span is, it is, again, threatened by many a threat. As you have to shed the bondages of your actions (*karmic* bondages) of the past in such a short life, O Gautama ! do not entertain *pramāda* even for a *samaya*.⁵
4. (In the eternal cycle of life and death) for all the living beings, the Human life is very difficult to come by in a long time, and the fruits of *karmas* are very difficult to bear. Hence, O Gautama! do not let *pramāda* overcome you even for a *samaya*.⁶
5. (With the passage of time) your body is weakening, your hair are greying, and your entire vitality is diminishing. Hence, O Gautama! do not indulge in *pramāda* even for a *samaya*.⁷
6. Ailments such as fouling of body airs, wounds and eruptions, cholera and various other deadly diseases destroy your body

3. *dumpattae paṇḍuyae jahā, nivaḍai rāigaṇāṇa accae I*
evaṃ maṇuyāṇa jīviyaṃ, samayaṃ Goyama ! mā pamāyae II
Uttarādhyayana-sūtra, 10/1.
4. *kusagge jaha osabindue, thovaṃ ciṭṭhai lambamāṇae I*
evaṃ maṇuyāṇa jīviyaṃ, samayaṃ Goyama ! mā pamāyae II
Ibid., 10/2.
5. *ii ittariyammi āue, jīviyae bahupaccavāyae I*
vihuṇāhi rayaṃ pure kaḍaṃ, samayaṃ Goyama ! mā pamāyae II
Ibid., 10/3.
6. *dullahe khalu māṇuse bhava, ciraḱāleṇa vi savva—pāṇinaṃ I*
gāḍhā ya vivāga kammaṇo, samayaṃ Goyama ! mā pamāyae II
Ibid., 10/4.
7. *parijūrai te sarīrayaṃ, kesā paṇḍurayā havanti te I*
se savvabale ya hāyanti, samayaṃ Goyama ! mā pamāyae II
Ibid., 10/26.

when they (suddenly) erupt. Hence, O Gautama ! do not practise *pramāda* even for a *samaya*.⁸

In the thirty-second chapter of the *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*, the Lord has indicated 95 areas of activity, which when practised, will steer the *sādhaka* along the path of spiritual attainment and ultimately to salvation (*nirvāṇa*). These have been termed as the abodes of discretion or the *Apramādashāna*. By dispelling the ignorance (*ajñāna*), attachment (*rāga*), and revulsion (*dveṣa*), the *sādhaka* is able to attain the supreme bliss (enlightenment) and the spiritual salvation (*nirvāṇa*). The *rāga* and *dveṣa* are the seeds of *karma* (the *karmic* bondage) and they produce the delusion (*moha*) of the spirit (*ātman*).⁹ Hence the path to spiritual salvation lies in avoiding the seats of indiscretion (*Pramādashāna*) and adhering to the seats of discretion (*Apramādashāna*). The seats of indiscretion (*Pramādashāna*) are the pursuits of bodily pleasures – the pleasures of the five sense-organs (*indriyas*) of touch, smell, hearing, sight and taste. These sense-organs have been termed as thieves that steal the opportunities for spiritual attainment, and under the influence of these thieves, the creatures indulge in unlimited distorted activities that hinder the soul from attaining the *nirvāṇa* or *mokṣa*.¹⁰

Exhorting the spiritual practitioners (*sādhakas*), the Lord has said that they should start on the spiritual highway while their bodies are still strong, till they are not harassed by the old age, till they have not been overpowered by disease and till their sensory organs (*indriyas*) have not been dulled and benumbed by the onslaught of disease and decay.¹¹

The sum and substance of this deliberation is that *pramāda* or indulgence in idle pursuits, pursuit of transient bodily pleasures, indiscretion, negligence and carelessness even in the performance of

8. *araī, gaṇḍaṃ, visūiyā, āyaṅkā vivihā phusanti te I*
vivaḍai, viddhaṃsai te sarīrayaṃ, samayaṃ Goyama ! mā pamāyae II
Ibid., 10/27.

9. *rāgo ya doso vi ya kammabhiyaṃ.*
Ibid., 32/7.

10. *evaṃ viyāre amiyappayāre, āvajjai indiyacora-vasse II*
Ibid., 32/104.
indiyakasāyācorā, subhāvanā sankhalāhi vajjhanti; tā te rāgadosādi na
vikuvvanti I

Bhagavatiārādhanā, 1401.

11. *jarā jāva na piḍei, vāhi jāva na vaḍḍhai I*
jāva indiyā na hāyanti, tāva dhammaṃ samāyare II
Daśavaikālika, 8/36.

essential bodily functions are hindrances in the path of spiritual advancement, and, therefore, *pramāda* ought not to be indulged even for a *samaya* or the millionth part of a second. The words of the Lord, “*Samayaṃ Goyama! mā pamāyae*” have been echoing through the ages, and have been exhorting the *sādhakas*, through these more than two thousand five hundred years. to this day. The exhortation, though addressed to Gaṇadhara Gautama, is aimed at each and every individual, who has his sights set on spiritual salvation or *Nirvāṇa*.

So, *Samayaṃ Sādhakaṃ mā pamāyae* it is, for anyone who will hear and heed.

THE FOLLOWERS OF PĀRŚVANĀTHA

BINOD KUMAR TIWARY

Pārśvanātha, the powerful religious teacher of the 9th-8th centuries B.C. has been accepted as one of the great propagators of Jain principles and ideas. He was the 23rd Tirthaṅkara of the Jain order and traditions. As a reformer, he fought against the prevailing corrupt practices which were prevalent in the then society and religion. He preached the welfare of humanity without taking into account the caste, creed or sect.

After getting the perfect knowledge, Pārśva became the head of an enormous community. He had eight *gaṇas* and eight *gaṇadharas*.¹ The *saṃgha* of Pārśvanātha consisted of *śramaṇas*, nuns, lay votaries, female lay votaries and different types of saints.² The Śvetāmbaras and Digambaras give different account and number of the followers of Pārśva, but the Digambaras give their number very high, which seems to be an exaggeration. The division of Jain *saṃgha* into different branches prove his great organisational capacity.

The followers of Pārśva belonged to all factions of the society. By virtue of his descent, his influence in royal family was great. He himself was a member of the royal family of Kāśī. The Jain writers inform us that Nāgmati (king of Gandhāra), Nimi (king of Videha), Dvimukha (king of Pañchāla), Svayambhū (king of Hastināpura), Ravikirti of Kuśasthalapura and Karakaṇḍa (king of Kalinga) had adopted the faith of Pārśva.³

The ancient literary sources reveal that Gautama Buddha had also been under Jain influence for some time before becoming enlightened.⁴ The statement of Buddha itself confirms this truth. Most of the facts, detailed by Buddha, are remarkably close to the conduct of Jain religion. Relating to his ascetic life, he said, 'I lived nude, took my food in hands.... uprooted my hair... and never warmed my body.'⁵ Some scholars are of the view that as the way shown by Pārśva seemed to be very difficult and tedious, the Buddha invented the middle path which is known as *madhyamapratipadā*.⁶

1. *Kalpasūtra*, 160 (SBE, Vol. xxii, p. 273).
2. *Ibid.*, 161 to 166.
3. *Uttarādhyaṇa*, 18-40-50 (SBE, Vol. XLV, p. 81).
4. *Darsanaśāra*, 6-9.
5. *Majjhima Nikāya*, *Mahāsīhanada Sūta*, 12.
6. *Veer Parinirvāṇa*, Oct. 1975, p. 15

The teachings of Pārśva were very much popular among the general people during those days. People from all walks of life were immensely influenced by it. Pārśva had a large number of such followers in Bihār and eastern U.P. regions. Mahāvīra's parents were worshippers of Pārśva⁷ and they died practising the slow starvation following Jain faith.⁸ There existed a number of monks of Pārśvanātha's order following *caturyāma dharma* during the time of Mahāvīra who absorbed them into his order by converting them to his doctrine of *pañcamahāvratas*. It appears that he drew his followings largely from the non-Aryan indigenous tribes like the *Yakṣas*, *Nāgas* and *Asuras* and from the so-called *Vrātya* or non-Vedic *kṣatriyas*.

The *Uttarādhyayana-sūtra*⁹ relates to the meeting of the head of Pārśva's follower Keśikumāra and Mahāvīra's *gaṇadhara* Indrabhūti. Their discussions concentrated mainly on the principles of the Jain religion. Keśi was greatly satisfied by Mahāvīra's explanation and he accepted the five great vows of Mahāvīra. Keśi and Gautam of this meeting represent the two Jain orders, the old and the new. The *Bhagavati-sūtra*¹⁰ refers to a dispute between Kālāsavesiyaputta, a follower of Pārśva with a disciple of Mahāvīra. Gaṅgeya, a follower of Pārśva, who lived at Vāṇijyagrāma, gave up the four vows of Pārśva and adopted the five *mahāvratas* of Mahāvīra.¹¹ Before accepting the Mahāvīra's five precepts (*pañca-mahāvratas*), Gaṅgeya had a discussion with Mahāvīra.¹² Clearing the doubts in the mind of Gaṅgeya, Mahāvīra showed his respect for Pārśvanātha, acknowledging him as a superman.¹³ The *Nāyadhammakahāo*¹⁴ mentions the name of Puṇḍariya, who accepted the four vows of Pārśva. The famous disciple of Mahāvīra named Gautama met Udaka, a follower of Pārśva and succeeded in winning over him to his side. From the dialogue between Udaka and Gautam, it appears that the followers of Pārśva and the disciples of Mahāvīra were known as the Nighantha Kumāraputta and Nigantha Nātaputta respectively. It is quite interesting to know that at a place called Tuṅgiyā,¹⁵ about five hundred pupils of Pārśva embraced the five *mahāvratas* of Mahāvīra.¹⁶

7. *Ācārāṅgasūtra*, II, 15, 16.

8. This goes to prove Pārśvanātha to be the predecessor of Mahāvīra.

9. 23, vv. 1-89; SBE, XLV, pp. 115-129.

10. *Bhagavati-sūtra*, 1. 975; cf. also Weber's *Fragment der Bhagavati*, p. 185.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

12. *Vyākhyāprajñapatti*, 9.32.371.

13. Pārśvanātha is called *Purisadāniya* in *Kalpasūtra* (Chapter 1, para 25).

14. *Nāya*, 19, 20. 218.

15. This place is identified with modern Tugī, situated two km off Biharsarif according to *Prāchin Tīrthamālā*, pt. 1, p. 16.

16. *Bhagavatisūtra*, pp. 136 ff.

The Buddhist literature mentions some Niganthas who were the followers of Pārśva. These include Vappā¹⁷, Upālī¹⁸, Abhaya¹⁹, Aggivesayana Saccāka²⁰, Dīgha Tapassi²¹, Asibandhakaputra gāmini²², Deva Ninka²³, Upalikka²⁴, and Sihā.²⁵

Not only men but lay women also joined Pārśva's order as he had allowed women to enter his order. The *Nāyadhammakahā*²⁶ says that Kālī, an old maiden, joined Pārśva's order and was entrusted to Pupphachāla, the head of the nuns. Two sisters of Uppala joined the order of Pārśva, but being unable to lead the rigid life of the order, they became Brāhmiṇ *parivṛājikās*.²⁷ Vijaya and Pagabbha, two female disciples of Pārśva saved Mahāvīra and Gośāla in Coorg Saṇṇivesa.²⁸ The Jātaka literature also mentions several lay women as followers of Pārśva and among them are Saccā, Lohā, Avandika and Padacāra etc.²⁹

Pārśva's influence not only remained within the areas of this land, but it reached even in the far areas of Central Asia³⁰ and Greece.³¹ Scholars have proved that the ancient city of Kasita (Caspia) appears to have been named after Kāśyapa, the *gotra* name of Pārśva. The Greeks of the 4th century B.C. and the Chinese pilgrims of the 6th-7th centuries A.D. noticed the existence of the Nirgrantha Śramanas in that region. Hence it has reasonably been inferred that Jainism was prevalent in places like Caspia, Aman, Samarkand and Balkha³² and the credit would certainly go to Pārśva.

Pārśva attained *nirvāṇa* at Sammedaśikhara (Pārśvanātha hill)³³ and that's why it became a centre of Jain faith.³⁴ Pārśvanātha preached

17. *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, II, 196 ff.

18. *Majjhima-nikāya*, I, 371 ff.

19. *Ibid.* 392 ff.

20. *Ibid.* 237 ff; *Majjhima Nikāya Atthakathā*, I, 450.

21. *Ibid.*, 237 ff.

22. *Samyutta-nikāya*, IV, 312 ff.

23. Ninka is a deva who visited Buddha and uttered a verse in praise of Nigantha Nātaputta.

24. *Mahāvagga*.

25. *Samyutta-nikāya*, I, 65 ff.

26. *Nāya*, II, i, pp. 22 ff.

27. Women wanderers.

28. *Jātaka*, III, i.

29. *Ibid.*

30. cf. J.W. McCrindle's *Ancient India*.

31. Beal's *Siyuti*, I, p. 55.

32. Cf. *Jain Gazette*, August 1906, p. 13.

33. *Kalpasūtra*, 186, (SBE, XXII, p. 275).

34. Pārśvanātha Hill is in Hazaribagha of Bihār.

his *nirgrantha dharma* among the aboriginals of modern South Bihar and Bengal. Even today, the followers of Pārśvanātha or his teachings can be seen within the 'Sarāka' community in Mānbhūm, Singhabhūm, Lohardaggā and other districts of south Bihār and Bengal. The name of this community 'Sarāka' is nothing but a degenerated form of the word *Śrāvaka*.³⁵ They belong to the same lineage of ancient Jain *śrāvakas*. During the recent past, they have embraced Hinduism, though a few of them still follow Jainism at some places. This tribe is mainly engaged in plantation, spinning, weaving and commerce. Like the orthodox Jains, the members of this community drink water after straining it and have their meals before the Sun set, with the idea to protect living beings.³⁶

In the regions of Birbhūm and Bāñkurā districts of West Bengal, the serpent deity called 'Manasā' is worshipped during the months of *Āsāḍha*, *Śrāvaṇa*, *Bhādrapada* and *Āśvina*³⁷ (approximately during the period from July to October). This may be having some connection with the legend that Dharmendra had adorned Pārśvanātha's head in the shape of *Nāgarāja*.³⁸ This apparently shows that in course of time, they took to the worshipping of the very symbol which had adorned Pārśvanātha. Originally they must have been the followers of Pārśva.

The Jain religion was essentially anterior to Mahāvīra and Pārśvanātha had been an earlier historical personage. He not only gave a strong base to the Jain principles, but even paved the way for Mahāvīra to preach, organise and give a new shape to the Jain *saṃgha*.

35. A technical word in Jainism (meaning 'a layman').

36. J.C. Jain. *Mahāvīra*, p. 10.

37. *Jaina-Siddhānta-Bhāskara*, Vol. II, Pt. II, p. 75.

38. J.C. Jain, *op.cit*.

NEWS ON JAINISM AROUND THE WORLD

Summer school in Prakrit Language and Literature


The three Week Summer School was inaugurated at the Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology on May 24, 1998. The Valedictory Function was held in the morning of June 14, 1998. The function started with the traditional Jaina *namokāra mahāmantra* and a *Sarasvativandanā* in Prakrit.

Forty very senior teachers and research scholars in Indian Universities and Colleges, from all over the country, participated in the School, as whole-time students.

Professor S.R. Banerjee from Calcutta University, related in brief the history of activities of the Summer School for the last 10 yearly sessions. Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, Academic Director of the IGNCA was the chief guest, and Hon. Justice M.N. Venkatchaliah, Chairman, NHRC was the guest of honour. Shri Parasmal Bhansali, Chairman, Nakoda Parshvanath Jain Pedhi, presided. Shri Pratap Bhogilal, Chairman, BLII, Shri N.P. Jain, Vice-Chairman, BLII and Shri R.K. Jain, Hony. Secretary, Atma Vallabh Jain Smarak Shikshan Nidhi, all very actively participated in the conduct of the function and introduced different institutions connected with the BLII. Prizes to first three top students in the School were presented along with certificates to all the 40 participants.

Ācārya Hemacandrasūri Puraskār was presented on this occasion to the well-known scholar of Prakrit and Sanskrit Studies, Dr. V.M. Kulkarni by Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, the chief guest, on behalf of Nanakchand Jaswanta Dharmarth Trust founded by Shri Deven Yashwant, Chairman.

Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah in his address quoted examples from various well-known personalities of the western world and India to convey the message that whatever we do including small jobs like sweeping, must be done whole-heartedly and excellently. He said, "Indology represents the great Indian civilization which not only speaks of the concepts of cosmology, mind and matter, the circular time and absolute truth but also integrates them all. In order to understand the cultural heritage of this great country, indology is the only way. In this age of diminishing values, objective moral values are very important



Āchāryya Hemchandra Sūri Puraskār

which have been prescribed by our ancient authorities. The modern concepts of mind and cosmology etc., are the product of the recent times and these are dealt with in Indological tradition well over several thousand years back, in the history of human civilization.”

Dr (Mrs) Kapila Vatsyayan, the Chief Guest, exhorted the august gathering that all Indian languages from North to South and East to West are integrally related to each other whether it is Vedic or Sanskrit, Pali or Prakrit, Tamil or Telugu, Malayalam or Mārāthī or whatever else.

Though lots of Dravidian elements are available in the Vedas also, Pali and Prakrit have played a very important role in the development of Indian culture, languages, literature and dialects as a whole. If we do not learn the history of the development of our national languages, then we cannot even study mathematics, physics and philosophy etc.

Three crores of manuscripts are lying unused in the Jain Bhāṇḍāras. Whatever the western scholars have said about them, we have been in a way forced to accept and believe. If these mss., are micro-filmed, our Indian scholars can have access to them and these can be studied seriously and sincerely opening new vistas of knowledge of our ancient culture.

Dr. V.M. Kulkarni, the awardee of Ācārya Hemcandrasūri Puraskār, the first Director of the BLII, in his speech of acceptance of the award, briefly stated, how he has been working for well over 60 years in the field of Prakrit and Sanskrit Languages & Literature. The award has come to him only as a token of recognition of his services to ancient Indian languages and literature.

The Function was conducted by Dr. V.P. Jain, Director, BLII.

Vimal Prakash Jain

II

INDIAN RELIGIONS JOIN HANDS

Temple event shows U.S. adaptation

Lord Mahāvīra—or rather, a 5-foot marble statue of him—takes up residence in the Hindu Temple of Greater Cincinnati this weekend amid lectures, feasts and an aerial shower of flowers.

The event brings together two religions that have flourished in India since ancient times : Hinduism, which covers a wide range of beliefs and practices, and Jainism, founded by Mahāvīra in the sixth century B.C. The interreligious event is made possible by the close ties that Indian immigrants have forged here and in other U.S. cities.


“In India, you wouldn't find this,” said Vir Jain, a member of the Jain Center of Cincinnati and Dayton. “This temple is a Hindu temple that represents Hindu culture, and Jain is a part of Hindu culture. What we represent here is Hindu culture rather than Hindu religion.”

Cincinnati-area Jains and Hindus had talked about building a combined temple, but as fund raising for the Hindu temple dragged on, the Jains built their own in the West Chester area a few year ago. An estimated 1,200 Hindu families and about 100 Jain families live in the area.

Jains stress non violence, a multiplicity of viewpoints and freedom from possessiveness, and they believe in the peaceful co-existence of all living beings. Hindus believe the ultimate reality behind the universe is manifested as deities that vary from region to region. All Hindus share belief in the law of *karma* and rebirth, and the fourfold goal of human life (righteousness, worldly prosperity, enjoyment and liberation).

From the beginning, the local Hindu temple stressed unity by including deities from all regions of India. South Asian religion expert Raymond Williams said this ecumenism grows out of the surge in Indian immigration since 1965.

“The community created here (in the United States) is different than any group of Indians that exists in India itself,” said Mr. Williams, a Professor of religion at Wabash College in Crawfordsville, Ind, “These people are in the process of re-creating what it means to be an American Hindu and that negotiation, as it shapes identities and commitments,



Detroit Jain Temple

is reflected in the way they build temples and shrines and mosques and Sikh gurdwara and Christian churches.”

Or, in the words of SamanShrutpragya, a Jain monk visiting from India: “Every religion has different philosophies and different ideas, but we try to make harmony. How can we make harmony? If you like to worship Mahāvira, you can worship Mahāvira. If you want to worship (Hindu deity) Krishna, you can worship Krishna.”

From The Cincinnati Enquirer, Metro/Butlei, May 15, 1998.

Conference on ‘Jainism and Ecology’ at Harvard

An international seminar titled “Jainism and Ecology” was held at Harvard University's Center for the Study of World Religions on July 10-12, 1998.

Dr. Sulekh Jain, president of the Jain Academic Foundation of North America (JAFNA) told *India Abroad* recently that the conference was being sponsored by the foundation jointly with the Jain Academy of the United Kingdom.

“The topic of Jainism and ecology presents many interesting challenges to scholars and leaders of the Jaina tradition,” says the conference convener, Dr. Christopher Key Chapple, Professor of Theological Studies at the Harvard University's Center for the Study of World Religions.

Participants were to include Cromwell Crawford of the University of Hawaii in Honolulu, Kim R. Skoog of the University of Guam, John Koller of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, John Cort of Denison University, Padmanabh Jaini and Kristi L. Weley, both of the University of California at Berkeley, and Paul Dundas of the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.

A large number of Jain scholars from India have also been invited to participate in the conference, Sulekh Jain said.

The topics put down for discussion include “Jain Cosmology and Ethics for the Eco-Crisis,” “Jain Biocosmology and environmental Thought,” “Ahimsa as a Categorical Imperative for Environmental Care.” “Jain Principle of Ahimsa and Ecology. “Ecology and Spirituality in Jain Tradition,” “The Nature of Nature Jain Perspectives on the Natural World.” and “Digging Ahimsa. The Limits of a Jain Environmental Ethic.”

The proceedings of the conference will be published in a book form by Harvard University. [From *India Abroad*, July 10, 1998. Sulekh Jain.]



If pure music had the power to beckon
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