ISSUE -4   April 2023   Volume 57

jain journal

॥ जैन भवन ॥

JAIN BHAWAN PUBLICATION

Jain Journal

A Peer Reviewed Research Quarterly

SPECIAL ISSUE ON 'JAINA LOGIC'

|| जैन भवन ||

JAIN BHAWAN

Rupees Twenty

Editorial Board

For article, reviews, and correspondence kindly contact

Dr Lata Bothra

Chief-Editor

Email: latabothra13@Yahoo.com | latabothra@gmail.com

Mobile: 9831077309

We are going to publish the next issue of Jain Journal as the **'Sarak Special Number'**

In this issue we are going to publish articles on the Jaina Sarak Community of Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa, especially the history, development, socio-economic profile, ethnic identity, religious culture, current status of this Jaina lay community known as Sarak.

You are cordially invited to contribute your valuable article/paper

Contents

JAIN BHAWAN

Bhartrhari's Criticism in Jain Logic: A Study

Dr. Narendra Kumar Dash

The grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari opines that *Sabda* is the substratum of the world of appearance and thus he accepts the theory of *Sabdadvaita*. However, this key-stone of the Grammarians' system of metaphysics has elaborately been controverted by the rival schools. Here we propose to record the dialectics of the Jaina philosophers, one of the rival schools of metaphysics.

This theory of Bhartrhari has been subjected to severe criticism by the *Naiyayika*s, *Mimamsaka*s, Buddhists and Jainas. Now, for our practical purpose we discuss the view of the Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi (9th century A.D.), Abhayadev Suri (11th century A.D.), Prabhacandra (1st half 12th Century A.D.), Vadideva Suri (second half of 12th Century, A.D.) and Yasovijaya Gani (18th Century A.D.).

The Jaina logicians argue that the *Sabdabrahman* is a *prameya* and a *prameya* needs a *pramana* for its recognition (1). There is no *pramana* through which we can prove the existence of the *Sabdabrahman* (2).

In the *Tattavarthaslokavartika*, Vidyanandi opines that the *Sabdabrahman* is not proved by perception, inference and verbal Testimony (3). This standpoint of Vidyanandi is also supposed by Santaraksita, Abhayadeva, Prabhacandra and Vadideva. However, Prabhacandra and Vadideva ask the grammarians during their discussion that the *Sabdabrahman* is recognised by *indriyajanya pratyaksa* or by *atindriya pratyaksa* or by *Svasamvedanasila pratyaksa*? The first alternative is not qualified enough to recognise the *Sabdabrahman* as it is not recognised by the Jaina Logicians. They argue that this type of *pratyaksa* is illusory like the perception during dream (4). Thus, the sensual perception may not be taken as a cause of the perception of the *Sabdabrahman*. In the *Sanmatitarka Prakarana* it has been argued that a sense perceives that which is present and which is also large (*sthula*) in nature. Therefore,

the *Sabdabrahman* is not perceived by the sense organs. This is also supported by Prabhacandra in his *Prameyakamalamartanda* (5). During the discussion, both Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri raise the same question — by which sense organ do we receive the *Sabdabrahman*? either by *Srotrendriya* or by any other *indriya* (6). Since the *Sabdabrahman* is beyond the subject of the *Srotrendriya* that may not be a cause to know the *Sabdabrahman* . If we accept that this is subject of the *Srotrendriya*, then we have to accept that everything should be known by each and every *indriya* (sense organ). But it is not possible to accept. Again, in the *Nyayakumudacandra* it has been explained that the other sense organs (i.e. other than *Srotrendriya*) also are not qualified enough because for the perception of the *Sabdabrahman*; because *Sabda* may not be a subject of any other sense organ other than the *Srotrendriya* (7). Thus, it may be concluded that the *Sabdabrahman* is not recognised by the *indriyajanya pratyaksa*.

The *Sabdabrahman* is also not a subject of the *atindriyapratyaksa*. In the *Nyaya-Kumuda Candra* , Prabhacandra opines that the *anindriyapratyaksa* without any sense organ is not accepted by the grammarians and therefore, that should not be the cause to establish the *Sabdabrahman* (8). In the reply the grammarians argue that a Yogi realises the existence of the SB (*Sabdabrahman*) through *Dhydna* and therefore the existence of the SB is proved by *atindriyapratyaksa* of the Yogis. Now the Jaina logicians again argue that if the SB is the only ultimate reality, then who will be there to realise it? and if we accept to the Yogis, then we have to accept the Yoga also. Thus, the concept of *advaita* 'non-duality' will no more exist (9).

Further, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri ask the opponents that if there exists the SB then why do we not feel the existence of that? Here they give two alternatives:

> (i) Due to the absence of *Grahaka (Grahakatvabhava)*
>
> (ii) Due to the Avidya (*Avidyabhibhuta*) (10).

We may not say that due to the first alternative the SB is not manifested, because, in the *Sabdadvaitasiddhanta* the SB is *grahaka* and the *grahaka-Sakti* always exists in it: (11) and the second alternative also is not possible as the existence of *Avidya* is not recognized by the Jaina logicians. It is not out of context to mention that in the *Nyayakumudacandra.* Prabhacandra categorical rejects the existence of the *Dvaividya* (12). This standpoint of Prabhacandra is also supported by *Vadideva* suri in the

Syadvadaratnakara (13). In this context the Jaina logicians again argue that since the *grahaka-sakti* exists always in the SB, we cannot say that due to the absence of the *grahaka-Sakti* the SB does not manifest. Again, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri argue that *Avidya* is neither identical with SB not with other than the SB (14) and if it is other than the SB then either it is a *vastu* or it is *avastu?* Both these alternatives have been rejected by the Jaina logicians in their respective works and therefore, according to them, *avidya* is neither a *vastu* nor an *avastu* viz. (*na ca laghepa praheyatgayasya brahmanah tadasat tathapratibhaso muktotiprasangat napyavasturad vastuno' nyathabhavo bhavati atiprasangat ca* (N.K.C. p.143) and *atha vastuth tanna, abhyupagamaksatiprasakteh (*ibid. 1/5, p.143). Thus, the existence of the *avida* has been rejected by the Jainas and it may be suggested that like the *Indriya-pratyaksa,* the SB is also not proved by *the Anindriya-pratyasa.*

Now we should think about the *Svasamvedanapratyaksa.* According to Vidyanandi if the knowledge which is *ksanika* and *niramsa* (Buddhists views) is not proved by the above *pratyasa,* then how shall we establish the existence of the SB by the said *Pratyaksa* (15)? In this connection, Prabhacandra says that during dream *(Svapnavastha)* we cannot feel the SB which manifests with *atmajyoti,* by the *svasamvedanapratyaksa* otherwise, each and every creature will attend liberation without any effort. Because it has been categorically mentioned it the *Advaita-sabda-siddhanta* that the *svasamvedanatva* of SB, which manifests with *atmajyoti* is liberation. Again, he explains that if the SB will be *svasamvedanasila,* then the words like *ghata* and *pata* should be *svasamvedanasila,* as these words are the *vivarta* of the SB. But this is not accepted, because all the words are not *svasamvedanasila.* Thus, the Jaina logicians argue that the SB is not perceived by *svasamvedana-pratyaksa* (16). Now we may conclude that the existence of the SB is not proved by perception.

Like perception, the existence of SB is also not proved by inference, another means of the valid knowledge. Secondly, it is also a fact that the inference is not recognized by *Sabdavaitavadis* as a way of valid knowledge. In this connection, Vadideva Says that: *napyaymanena, tasya tatsadbhavavedakasya kasyacidasambhavati* (17). *Acarya* Vidyanandi also explains vividly regarding this problem. According to him since in the *Sabdadvaitaisiddhanta,* inference is not recognized as a means of valid-knowledge, how

can we prove the existence of the SB by inferences (18):

Again, the Jain logicians ask that by which inference the *Sabdadvaitavadins* prove the existence of SB; either by *Karyalinganumana* or by *Svabhavalinganumana* (19)? This is also supported by Abhayadeva Suri and Prabhacandra (20). According to Jaina scholars the first alternative is not justified here, because the eternal SB has an action; neither it has any action chronologically *(arthakriya)*, not it has any action collectively. If there is no action, then how can we, say that the SB may be established through *Karyalinganumana.* The second alternative also has no scope to prove the existence of the SB; because it is needed first to establish the existence of the *dharmi* SB and after that only we can prove it by inference, which is the *Svarupabhutadharma* of the SB. But when the *Dharmi* SB, has no existence, then its *Svabhavalinga* is automatically regarded as non-existence. Thus, the SB is not established by inference, the second way of valid knowledge.

In the *Tattvartha-Sloka-varttika,* Vidyanandi refutes the possibility that the SB is proved by the means of Verbal Testimony. He says :

> *agamadeva tat-siddhau bhedasiddhistatha na kim.*
>
> *nirbadhat-eva cettacyam na pramanamatarad-rte,*(21)

Further, he explains that the followers of the *,Sabdadvaita* concepts say the existence of the SB is recognized by verbal testimony, which is free from any kind of obstacles *(badharahita).* Here Vidyanandi does not support the *nirbadhatva* of the verbal testimony as there is no valid knowledge to prove this (22).

Again, an interesting doubt has been raised by Jaina logicians like Vidyanandi, Prabhacandra and Vadideva Suri that the SB is identified with verbal testimony or the SB in separate from the verbal testimony? In the Case of former alternative, the verbal testimony may not be a cause for the establishment of the SB due to the lack of the relation of cause and effect *(karya-karana bhava).* The second alternative is also impossible here, because if we accept two things like the SB and the verbal testimony, then the *advaita* "non-duality" character of the SB will no longer exist. It is needless to say here again that the grammarians accept the SB as "non-duality", and says everything is produced from it viz.:

tad-agamasya niscetum sakyam jatu pariksakaith.

nacagamastato nginnah samasti paramarthatah (23).

To refute the objection of the Jaina logicians, the grammarians may argue that verbal testimony is the *vivarta* of the SB. However, Vidyanandi nicely rejects this type of argument of the grammarians. According to him if the verbal testimony or will be the *vivarta* "appearance" of the SB like other things, then this means of knowledge will be treated as *avidya,* which is *asat.* Now he asks the opponents that an *asat,* i.e. the verbal testimony may not be a cause for a *sat* one i.e. the SB viz *tad-vivartastva vidyatma tasya prajnapakah katham* (24). Thus, the verbal testimony may not be a case to prove the existence of the SB.

In the *Tattvarthaslokavarttika,* Vidyanandi not only rejects the existence of the SB, but directly attains Bhartrhari quoting his first verse from the *Vakyapadiya.* He also opines that there is no such type of *Brahman* who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the word, who is the cause of the manifested phenomenon, who appears as the objects from whom the creation of the world proceeds viz.

tato natva oaram brahmastyanadinidhanatmakam.

Vivarte-tvarthabhavena prakriya jagato yatah (25).

Thus, the Jaina logician rejects the existence of the SB, which is, according to the grammarians, the real cause of this universe. They not only reject the existence of the SB, but also argue that the world is not engulfed with words *"Sabdamaya"*. According to them since the SB is eternal in character, how any change *"vivarta* or *parinama"* is possible with that? Again, they think if the grammarians argue that at the time of change the SB leaves its own quality or not? As the SB is eternal, the first alternative does not seem to be possible and if the second will be accepted, then, as all the things are engulfed with SB, a dwarf *"Vadhira"* will be able to listen everything after seeing the things produced from the S B viz. *rupa samvedana samaya vadhirasya sabdasamvedana prasanga* etc (26).

Like this, the Jainas, studied the philosophy of grammar in general and Bhartrhari especially and rejected the view that the world is produced from the SB, which is eternal and the world is engulfed with words. Besides, they reject the theories like: knowledge in general is *Sabdanuviddha,* there is eternal relation

between s*abda* and *artha* etc. These kinds of studies among the Jainas had taken place in between 9th century A.D. to 19th century A.D. The Jainas not only studied the philosophical side of the Sanskrit grammar, but they also prepared their own treatises on the word-formation, some of the works are critically edited and published, but many works are still in manuscript forms.

References:

1.   The Mimansakas also argue that *prameya* is recognised only by *pramana,* viz., *manadhina-meya-siddhi.* Abhaydeva Suri in *sanmatitaraka-prakaranatika* says ; *pramanadhina hi prameyavyavastha* (p.334)

2. Cf. *na ca evambhuta brahmasiddhaye pramanam-upa;abhayate ,* !bid, 3rd Pt., Gatha 6; p. 384.

3. Cf. *brahmano na vyavasthanam-aksajnanit kutacara.*

4. Cf. *brahmano na vyavasthanam-aksajnanit kutacara. svapnadaviva mithyatvattasya sakalpatah svayaniThe Tattvarthaslakavarttika* 1/3, sutra 20, Kanike-97, p.240. Also *Tattvartha sutra* (with explanation) Bombay, I am 1940, p.21.

5. Cf. *na khaly yathopavarnitasvarupam sabdabrahma pratyaksath praciyate, sanvada pratiniyatartha svarupagradaktvenaivasua pratieh.* The *Prameyakamala-marttanda,* 1/3, Bombay, 1941, p. 45.

6. Ref. the *Nyayakumudacandra,* 1/3, p.142.

7. Refer the *Syadvadaratnakara.* VII/6. p.78 and the *Nyayakumudacandra,* 1/5, p.142.

8. Cl; *napyatindriyapratyaksad; tasyaivatuasambhavat;* Prabhacandra on the *Nyayakumudacandra,* p. 142; also the *Syadvadaratnakara,* 1/ 7, p, 99.

9. Ibid.

10. *Athasti kasmanna prakasate-grahakabhavat*

avidyabhibhutatvada. The *Nyayakumudacandra,* 1/5, p. 142.

11. Cf. *grahyatvam grahakatvam ca dve sakti tejaso yatha tathaiva sarvasabdanamete prthagavasthite.* The *Vakyapadiya,* 1-55.

12. Cl; *sahibrahmano vyatirikta atiaikia va?* etc. The *Nyayakumudacandra* 1/5, p. 143.

13. Cf; *sahi sabdobrahmanah sakasadbinna bhaved-abhinna va,* 11/7, p. 99.

14. Refer note 12 above.

15. Cf;svatahssamvedaiatsiddhihksanikandmsavittivat. na parabrahmano napi sa yukta sadhanadvina. The *Tattvarthaslokavarttika* 1/3, *sutra* 20, p. 240.

16. CI; *na ca ghatadisabarho va svasamviditas vabhavah yatastadanvitatvam svasam vedamatah siddhayet, asvasamviditasvabhavatayaivasyapratipraniprasiddhatvat.* The *Nyayakumuda-candra,* 115, p. 144.

17. The *Syadvadratnakara* 1/7, p. 100.

18. Cf. *nanundariattatorthanampratitedurVabhatvatah. paraprasiddhirapyasya prasiddhanapramanika,* The *Tattvarthaslokavarttika,1/3, Sutra,* 20 Verse-97, p. 240.

19. Cf. *napyannmmanatah / tatha hi anumanam bhavat-karyalingam bhavet svabhavalingam va?* Kamalasila on *Tattvarthasamgraha-panjika-tika* verses 147-148, pp. 92-93.

20. Refer the *Sanmatitarkaprakaranatika*, *Gatha*-6 p. 384 and the *Prameyakamalamarttanda*, 1/3, p. 45

21. The *Tattvarthasiokavarttika* 1/3, *Sutra* - 20, Verse-99, p.241,

22. In the commentary the author opines that: *na hi bharantiriyamakhilabhedapratitir-ityaniscaye tadanyathanupapattya tadbijabhuttam sabdatattvam anadinidhanam brahma sidhyati/* etc. lbid, p. 241.

23. Ibid, verse 100; also the *Prameyakamalamarttanda.* IV/3, p.46, also the *Syadvadratnakara* 1/7, pp. 101.

24. The *Tattvarthaslokavarttika,* Ibid verse 101, p. 241,

25. Ibid, verse 103, p. 241.

26. The *Sammatitarkappanatika, p.* 381

Pramana and Naya in Jaina Logic

Dr V. K. Bharadwaja

[1] *Pramana* and *Naya* are two cardinal concepts in the Jaina theory of knowledge of what there is or what the Jainas say there is. It is almost impossible to say as to what the Jaina thinker is doing in the vast literature on the methodology of knowledge without our having a reasonably clear idea of his usage of the terms *Pramana* and *Naya.* But when one wants to seek clarity on the issue of distinguishing *Pramana* from *Naya* and the two from their related concept *syat* one feels simply baffled. At least, this is how I felt when I found myself confronted with the following statements of the Jaina position on the question whether *Naya* is or is not *a Pramana* and what after all is the connection, if any, between the two :

(T1) The class of *Pramana* sentences includes the whole class of *Naya* sentences. Only when the word *syat* or *kathamcit* is prefixed to a *Naya* sentence that it acquires the logical status of a *Pramanna.* (1)

(T2) The *Naya* consists in the particular intention of the knower who, suspending his judgment about the other parts, takes notice of one particular aspect of an object which is known through the *Pramana* of the scriptures. (2)

(T3) The *Naya* sentences are used to communicate knowledge, but they cannot be said to be either *Pramana* or *Apramana.* (3)

The above three theses T_1, T_2, and T_3, it seems to me, are quite different from one another. The thesis T_1 suggests that, unless a *Naya* sentence is prefixed by the word *syat* or *kathamcit,* the *naya* sentence will not qualify to be a *pramana-vakya.* The thesis T_2 treats a *naya* sentence as a claim to knowledge, that is, *a pramana,* and when it is conjoined to the thesis T_4**.**

(T4) As *Pramana* adds to knowledge by removing ignorance, so does *Naya* adds to knowledge by removing ignorance. (4)

The obvious thing that strikes one's mind is that a *naya* sentence communicating as it does knowledge of only one aspect of anything must itself be *a pramana.* It is plain then that if you accept the thesis T_1 you just cannot subscribe to the thesis T_2 conjoined to the thesis T_4. And conversely also. Faced with the dilemma of choosing one or the other alternative you are offered the thesis T_3, *namely,* that a *naya* sentence cannot be said to be either *pramana* or *apramana,* Apparently, the Jaina thinker has a way out of this discomforting situation. He may point out that we have misunderstood his position altogether. Prefix the word *syat* or *kathamcit* to the *naya* sentence.

   (A) A *naya* sentence is *a pramana*

       and to

   (B) A *naya* sentence is not *a pramana*

       and you obtain three perfectly consistent sentences

   (C) *Syat*, a *naya* sentence is a *pramanna*

   And

   (D) *Syat*, a *naya* sentence is not a *pramana*

   Or

   (E) *Syat,* a *naya* sentence is *pramana* as well as *apramana.*(5)

I do not think that this way of going about one's business in a discussion on the methodology of knowledge or the logic of evidence with which the Jaina thinker obviously is concerned will solve or help to solve the problem. My own feeling is that one feels cheated when a solution of this kind is presented to one who is seriously engaged in understanding what the Jaina ˉthinker is really doing when he makes the two notions of *naya* and *pramana* as the core concepts of his theory of knowledge. I propose therefore to follow a different tack to explicate the distinction exploiting of course whatever the relevant texts there are that are available to me.

[2] Consider a few examples that the Jaina thinker (6) has given in order to illustrate his conception of the notion of *naya, pramana* and *syat.* To say that *"Sadeva"* or that "This object has existence as its only property" is to exemplify a *durnaya* sentence. Again, to say that "Sat" or "This object has existence" is to exemplify *a naya* sentence. Finally, to assert "*Syat Sat*" or that 'this object has existence as one of its infinite properties" is to make a statement which properly belongs to the class of *pramana* sentences. These examples do throw some light on what the Jaina thinker had in mind

when he used the words *naya* and *pramana.* But, at the same time, these raise the question, *namely ;* If prefixing *syat* or *kathamcit* to any sentence make it a *pramana* sentence, then how are we going to reconcile this with the other position, *namely,* that while in a *naya* sentence one only aspect or property or relation of something is asserted to be known, while in *a pramana-vakya,* the whole of something is asserted to be known (7)? This question arises because the logical form and function of *a naya* sentence does in no way suggest that the sentence is used to communicate information about the object of knowledge as 'a whole, that is, about whatever aspects, properties, or relations that object may have either in itself or as it is related to the other objects. And, this is one condition which a *pramana vakya* is supposed to satisfy. It is possible that the way I have stated the condition which distinguishes a *pramana vakya* from a *naya vakya* makes it a very stringent requirement to be satisfied by a *pramana vakya.* And, hopefully, it is very likely that the Jaina thinkers never meant it is exactly the way as I have put it. However, in the rich philosophical literature which deals with the question of differentiating *a naya vakya* from *a pramana vakya,* they have tried to exploit the notion of *adesa* in outlining the features which are distinctive of a *naya vakya* but not of a *pramana vakya,* and also those which are distinctive of a *pramana vakya* but not of a *naya vakya.*

[3] The relevant Dictionary meaning of the word *adesa* is 'advice, instruction, precept, or rule'. But by an *adesa,* the Jaina thinker means a 'point of view'. We can look upon some particular thing from different points of view. Observing an object from one and only one point of view to the exclusion of every other, according to the Jaina thinker, does not enable us to describe an object as, adequately as one may wish it to be described. It is a different thing altogether that we may be interested in knowing and describing only one aspect or property of the object. But, knowing and describing only one property of the object does not mean knowing and describing its other properties also. This idea or differentiating a *specific description* of only one property from *a general description* of an object of knowledge is of the fundamental importance to the Jaina thinker. He employs this idea to divide (8) all *adesa* sentences into two sub-types : First *sakaladesa* sentences and secondly, *vikaladesa* sentences. A *vikaladesa* (9) sentence is used to describe one and only one *dharma* or property of *sat* or what is real, while a *sakaladesa* (10) sentence is used to give a general description of *sat* or what is real. To put it differently, *a sakaladesa* sentence describes what is *real synthetically; it* communicates information

about the entire, undivided reality, while *a vikaladesa* sentence describes the various *dharmas* or properties of '*sat*' analytically it communicates information about an '*amsa*,' an aspect or a part of what is real. This is how the Jaina thinker differentiates a *sakaladesa vakya* from *a vikaladesa vakya.* This distinction, however, is expressed in the traditionalistic jargon; but it may be stated in the ordinary language as the distinction between *a specific description* and *a general description* of what is real. A *sakaladesa* sentence is used to give a general description; while a sentence is employed to give a specific description of what is real. Both the types of sentences, however, are used to describe what the Jaina thinker calls '*sat*' (11) or reality. And, it seems to me that differentiating these two types of description sen tences is a perfectly legitimate thing to do for purposes of describing reality. But unfortunately, the distinction cannot be exploited to explicate the logical difference between a *Pramana vakya* and a *naya vakya.* Logically, both *a sakaladesa* sentence and also *a vikaladesa* sentences are bearer of true (of course, contingently true) information. Whether the information communicated by means of them in true or false is something which depends entirely upon what *pramana* is adduced in support of them. If the sentences are well-supported by one or more *pramana* they are said to be true, and if they are ill-supported, they are said to be false. The Jaina assertion (12) that *a sakaladesa vakya is a pramana vakya* while *a vikaladesa vakya* is a *naya vakya* is simply untenable. Differentiating a *pramana vakya* from *a naya vakya* on the basis merely of the extent or quantum of information they are used to communicate, will not do. We need a different criterion for distinguishing *a pramana vakya* from a *naya vakya* from the criterion on the basis of which we differentiate a *sakaladesa vakya* from *a vikaladesa vakya.* The Jaina thinker, it seems to me, has failed to see that the distinction between the first type of sentences necessarily requires the notion of truth or confirmation, while the distinction between the second type of sentences really does not. And if he uses the same criterion of division in both the cases, the Jaina logician could then be accused of having committed what in the traditional logic is known as the fallacy of cross division.

[4] Now, consider an example of a *vikaladesa* sentence :

    (F) This object has existence.

        Consider also an example of a *naya vakya:*

    (G) This object has existence.

    If you look at (F) and (G), both are identical sentences; and logically also they have the same status. The Jaina thinker, however, classifies them differently.

Why he does this, is not at all clear. It is not clear at least to me. He may have very good reasons for doing this; but no where, so far as I know, does he state or even suggest what reasons he has to characterize them differently. At the same time, he would not identify them as the same sentences. If he did this he will have to say that, as *a naya vakya* when prefixed by the word *syat* or *kathamcit* becomes *a pramana vakya* (13) so in the same manner *a yikaladesa vakya* when prefixed by the word *syat* or *kathamcit* would acquire the status of *a sakaladesa* sentence. But, I do not think that this consequence is acceptable to the Jaina thinker. This can be shown as follows. Consider an example of *a sakaladesa vakya*

(H) This object has infinite properties.

This sentence satisfies the condition of *a sakaladesa* sentence.

Prefix now the word *syat* or *kathamcit* to the *vikaladesa* sentence an example of which is The sentence (F) above, and the resulting sentence would be

(I.) This object has the property of existence as one of its infinite properties.

The two sentences (H) and (I) are in no way logically equivalent; nor are they semantically equivalent. Besides, the sentence (I) gives more information than the information given by the sentence (H). It follows that even if the prefixing of the word *syat* or *kathamcit* to a *naya* sentence turns it into *a pramana vakya,* the same device does not turn *a vikaladega* sentences into a *sakaladega vakya.* The point of the argument is that the criterion of distinguishing *a pramana vakya* from *a naya vakya* must be different from the criterion of differentiating a *sakaldesa vakya* from a *vikaladesa vakya.*

[5] On my analysis, the distinction between *a sakaladesa* sentence and a *vikaladesa* sentence is a distinction with respect to the quantum or the extent of information communicated by means of these sentences. A *vikaladesa* sentence is a specific description of some specific aspect of what is real, while, *sakaladesa* sentence is a general description of what is real. No question whatever of their truth values is involved in so far as we are concerned with a criterion of distinguishing them from each other. The distinction between *a pramana vakya* and *a naya vakya,* on the other hand, involves a criterion which has to do with the truth values of these sentences. And here also my feeling is that the innocent device of prefixing the word *syat* or *kathamcit* to a *naya* sentence will not turn it into a *pramana* sentence. Or, for that matter, removing the prefix *syat* or *kathatmcit* from a *pramana* sentence will not turn it into *a naya* sentence. This can be shown as follows –

The notion of *naya is* tethered to the ways in which *Sat* may be described (14) If we make a distinction between *dravya* and *paryaya* a distinction frequently made by the Jaina thinker, then *Sat* may be described either according to the *dravyarthika naya* or according to the *paryayarthika naya* (15), in other words, either by emphasizing on the *paryayas* or properties which an object has, or by emphasizing on the *dravya* or substance of which the predicates are asserted to be true or false (16). The result, however, will be a description of what is real or *Sat.* Giving a description of *Sat* is not saying that the given description is true or false. To show its truth or falsity you have to offer one or more relevant *pramanas* or evidences in confirmation of your description of *sat.* It is in this way that the notion of *pramana* is related to the notion of *naya.* Unless *pramana vakyas* are adduced in support of *a naya vakya,* the *naya vakyas* remain what they are, neither confirmed nor disconfirmed descriptions. Merely prefixing the word *syat* or *kathamcit* does not transform them into *pramana vakyas.* Particularly, under the circumstance that a Jaina statement is a privileged statement in that the word *syat* or *kathamcit* is always prefixed to it either explicitly or contextually or it is just tacitly understood to have been prefixed (17). Consider, for instance, the sentence.

(J) *Sat is anekantika.* (18)

This sentence (J) is *a pramana vakya.* The word *syat or kathamcit* is apparently not prefixed to it. Unless the word is tacitly assumed to have been prefixed to it, the sentence (J). does not qualify to be a *pramana vakya.* Then, how is it that it occurs as such without the prefix *syat* or *kathamcit as a pramana vakya* in the Jaina literature ? Our answer is: Not that the word *syat* or *kathamcit* when prefixed to it transforms in into a true statement ; but it is really the *pramana* or the evidence or the argument (19) that is adduced in favour of it that it makes it a true or an acceptable statement. The point of the argument is that it is the *pramarja* alone which transforms a sentence like (J) above into *a pramana vakya ;* the prefixing of the word *syat* or *kathamcit* does not do this ; the sentence remains where it is, a mere description only or a *naya vakya.*

[6] What I have done in this short paper is briefly this : I have argued *for* the thesis that *a vikaladesa* sentence and *a sakaladesa* sentence logically stand on a different footing from *a pramana* sentence and *a naya* sentence, and that the criterion of differentiating the first pair of sentences is different from the criterion of distinguishing the second pair of sentences. I have held the thesis that the question of How to describe that is real is conceptually different from the question of How to decide the truth values of sentences which are used to describe what is real. I have maintained the view that *a naya* sentence

whether the word *syat* or *kathamcit* (20) *is* prefixed to it or not, is a sentence which belongs to the set of those sentences that are offered in answer to the first question, namely, How to describe what is real: while *pramana vakyas* with or without the prefix *syat* or *kathamcit* are evaluated true or confirmed descriptions of what is said to be real.

Notes and References

1. Mallisena's *Syadvadamanjari* with Hemacandra's *Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatritnsika* (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No. LXXX1II ; 1933) p. 167.

2. Vadideva Suri's *Pramana-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara* (Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay; 1967). p. 508.

3. Yasovijaya Gani's *Jainatarkabhasa* (Delhi, 1973). p. 21 : Cf. *Tattvartha-slokavarttika,* 1.6.21.5.

4. *Pramava-Naya-Tattvalokalamkara* p. 538.

5. *Jain-Tarka-Bhasa ;* p. 21.

6. *Syadvadamanjari ;* pp. 159-169.

7. *Pramina-Naya-Tatttvalokalamkara ;* p. 508.

8. *Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatrirnsika ;* St. 23 ; p. 139 of *Syadvadamanjari,* op. cit.

9. *Syadvadamanjari*, p. 145. Cf. *Ratnakaravatarika,* Chapter 4.

10. Ibid, p. 146.

11. *Anyayoga-Vyavaccheda-Dvatrimsika ;* St. 21 ; p. 133-34 of *Syadvadamanjari.* Cf. *Tattvartha-siokavarttika ;* V. 29.

12. *Syadvadamanjari,* pp. 145-46.

13. *Syadvadamanjari,* p. 167.

14. Ibid, p. 161.

15. Ibid, pp. 138-48. Also, *Jain-Tarka-Bhasa,* p. 21.

16. Mid, pp. 138-48.

17. Ibid, p. 245.

18. Ibid, p. 136.

19. Ibid. p. 137.

20. In this paper, I have not discussed the logic of *Syat vakyas.* That forms the subject of another paper.

Exposition of Naya in Jaina philosophy

Dr Ajit Shuk deo Sharma

Serious students of Indian philosophy are well aware of the brilliant part played by Jaina Logicians in their polemics with Hindu and Buddhist logicians in ancient and medieval India. There is no doubt about it, that Jaina logic is one of the most valuable and ancient logic of India. Specially the doctrines of non-absolutism, the method of dialectical predications and the method of standpoints are the separate and peculiar dialectic development of Jaina logic. In the present paper I Want to discuss the method of standpoints in broad outline, leaving out subtle details. Because the subject is obviously very wide in scope, it cannot be treated fully in a small dissertation like this.

My treatment of the topic falls under four sections. Viz, 1 *naya* and *syadvada,* 2. *naya* and *pramana,* 2 *Naya* and *Niksepa* and 4. Definitions and kinds of *naya*s.

Nayavada and *syadvada*

The method of standpoints (*naya*s) and the method of dialectical predications (*Syadvada*) are the two main wings of non-absolutism (*Anekantavada*). In the words of Siddhasena Divakara, *Naya*s offers the individual Jewels, which are strung together by means of *syadvada,* into a necklace. Logically, these are two complementary processes forming a natural and inevitable development of the relativistic presupposition of the Jaina metaphysics. They form a schema which is per-eminently one of correlative methods rather than of theories of reality, although they both presuppose and explain the primordial notion that all reality is relativistic, *Nayavada* is principally an analytical method Investigating a particular standpoint of a factual situation according to the purpose and level of the equipment of experient (*jnatr*) Making a further distinction between *nayavada* and *syadvada* (*saptabhangi)* it can be said that *naya*s refer to the parts of a thing,

whereas the *saptabhangi* refers of thing as a whole, *naya*s have relation to analysis, whereas *saptabhangi* relates to synthesis. *Nayavada* is the analytical method of knowledge while *saptabhangi* or *syadvada* as the synthetical method of knowing a thing. According to H. Jacobi. It would be more correct to say that *syadvada* is a logical development thew corollary of *nayavada*. Dr A.N. Upadhye observes that *syadvada* is a corollary of *nayavada* and that the letter is analytical and Primarily conceptual and the former is synthetical and verbal. In this connection Dr. Padmarjiah says- "Although not quite incorrect, this distinction is apt to the somewhat misunderstood-if we are not aware of the background against which it is made. This is because the so-called 'primary conceptual method is also verbal, in as much as it not merely requires the aid of word for the express in of its various standpoints but also has as many as three., among its seven, standpoints which are exclusively designated a *saptabhangi*". Further he says, "Similarly, in con-tradiction to the verbal elements of the 'conceptual' *nayavada*, the 'mainly verbal' method of *Syadvada* is so much charged with the epistemological character that we might say that its verbal side is more instrumental than intrinsic in value". But under *Syadvada* no distinctions, such as the verbal modes of *syadvada* and non-verbal or the epistemological modes of *syadvada* can be made since all modes are both verbal and epistemological.

2. *Naya* and *Pramana*

Knowledge is attained by means of *pramana* and *naya*. Here, *pramana* is mentioned first as it is of superior excellence because it is the source or origin of *naya*. The *naya*s are the division of *pramana*. Jaina scriptures say, "Accepting knowledge derived from *pramana*, ascertaining one particular state or mode of substance is *naya*". Secondary, the range of *pramana* comprises all attributes. Similarly, it has been said that *pramana* is a comprehensive view, whereas *naya* is a partial view. In other words, *pramana* is called complete judgement (*sakaladesa*) while *naya* is called incomplete judgment (*vikaladesa*). Through, complete judgment, it is not possible for us to describe the infinite characteristics of an object. To overcome this difficulty, we use only one word that describes one characteristic of that object and hold the remaining characteristics to the identical with it. By this method we can describe all characteristics of an object by the description of a particular aspect only. This type of preposition is called *pramana, saptabhangi* or complete judgment. The identity of all other aspects with a simple aspect is proved by the identity of time, quality, substratum, relation, association and word. In the case of incomplete judgment the order is reversed. Every

judgment presupposes some difference in every aspect or quality. In regard to a complete judgement, time, quality etc. establish identity among various qualities, whereas with regard to an incomplete judgement time, quality, etc. prepare the ground for difference among various qualities. This kind of judgement is called *naya-saptabhangi* also.

In this connection, a question can be raised, how the partial truth conveyed by a *naya* is as valid as the full truth conveyed by *pramana*? The Jaina logicians attempt an answer to this by employing an analogical argument, in which they compare *naya* to a part of a Sea which is *pramana*. Now in so far as a part is identical with the whole itself, there is an essential non-difference between the two; a *naya* shares the validity, at any rate in some measure, of *pramana*. But, in so far as a *naya* is different from the whole, in some sense, it cannot be identical the whole and therefore the view of the *naya* as identical with the whole must be invalid. When it becomes invalid i.e. when its partial truth is taken to be the whole truth, It is called a *Kunaya* or *Durnaya*. According to Dr. Tatia, "the contingencies of `*Naya*' and '*Durnaya*` arise only when a knowledge situation is sought to be expressed in or understood through inadequate logical categories and linguistic symbols, which fall to express the knowledge in its pristine comprehensiveness unless their significance is rightly analyzed."

3. *Naya* and *Niksepa*

Etymologically, the term '*Niksepa*' stands for putting together' or 'classifying; but this meaning can hardly be recognized in the developed forms of the concept of *niksepa*. It is one such technique of exposition of words as well as interpretation of the nature of reality. Now, *naya* may be distinguished from it. *Naya* is a point of view from which we make some statement about the thing, while *niksepa* is an aspect of the thing itself. If we consider the statements merely as such, its point of view is *naya*; if we consider the fact which justifies the point of view it is *niksepa*.

4. Definition of *Naya* and its Kinds

The Jaina doctrine of modes or stand point, corresponds to the Greek doctrine of tropes, modes and conditions. The Jaina epistemology elaborated this doctrine in order to show that several judgments or propositions may be true about the same object, but from different

points or view. Here, it is interesting to note that each fact, however trivial it may appear, can be thoroughly understood in the context of the entire reality and only in the light of its interconnection with the rest of reality, A real is possessed of an infinite number of aspects and attributes which can be thoroughly comprehended only by a person who is directly acquainted with the whole order of the reality, in one word, who is omniscient. But this does not mean that the Jaina here offers a counsel of perfection which amounts to a counsel of despair for a person like us whose resources are limited. Though the full knowledge of all the possible characteristics even of a particle of dust cannot be claimed by any one of us, the knowledge of one or the other attribute can be attained if we are dispassionate and free from bias for one angle of vision and prepared for approaching it from other standpoints. Therefore, we must recognize that there are different ways of approach or expressing the same truth, and it is this that people may refer to when they speak of approaching the same truth from different stand points, this is the way in which the Jaina non absolutism dealt with opposed with opposed doctrines of the different schools. In this connection it can be said, "It is now not merely that all theories are on an equal footing, in the sense that we have no way of arguing for one against another, and hence the idea that one standpoint is superior to another must be left out."

If we look at an object from infinite number of views, we can say that there are infinite kinds of *naya*s because the object is composed of infinite number of characteristics and one *naya* knows only one characteristic. Therefore, there is difference of opinion among the Jainas on *nayavada* on the question of the number of *naya*s. But looking at it from a specific point of view, it is maintained that maya is of two kinds.

(1) *Dravyarthika* (dealing with generality) and (2) *Paryayarthika* (dealing with particularity). Again, the first is called *Arthanaya* in as much as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other are called *Sabdanaya*' in as much as they pertain to terms and its meanings.

Dravyarthika is the view of looking at the identity of things, while *Paryayarthika* is the view which looks at the difference of things. Man speaks of something either from the standpoint of identity or from that of difference. Statements of things from the former point of view are put under the head of *dravyarthika*, Propositions of objects from the standpoint of difference fall under the category of *paryayarthika*. Many minor classifications of things ranging between general (*dravyarthika*) and particular

(*paryayarthika*) viewpoints are also possible. But briefly speaking, there can be only two groups of statements. The view point of identity, upon which are founded the statements of generalization, is called *Dravyarthika Naya*, while the view point of difference, upon which are founded the statements of particularization is called *paryayarthika naya*. The *dravyarthikanaya* is further divided into three categories, viz., *Naigama, Samgraha* and *Vyavahara*. The subdivision of the *paryayarthikanaya* are four; *Rjusutra, Sabda, Sambhirudha* and *Evamabhuta*.

(1)   *Naigama*: It seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the scholars. According to Pujyapada it relates to the purpose of intention of something which is not accomplished. For instance, a person who goes equipped with an axe is asked by. any one for what purpose he is going. The person replies that the he goes to fetch a wooden measure (*prastha*). But at that time the wooden measure is based on the mere intention to make it. Similarly, one is engaged in fetching fuel, water, pot etc. He is asked by another person what he does? The former replies that he cooks food (*odana*). But he is not actually cooking food. He is only engaged in activity which will ultimately result in cooking food. Thus, in each of the two examples food (*odana*) and measure (*Prastha*) there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course of conduct of some duration. The course of conduct is represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In spite of this difference the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the idea aimed at.

Again, *Naya-karnika* says that, it views an object is possessing both the general and particular properties, because no object is posed of a general property unaccompanied with some particular property nor even of a specific property unaccompanied with the general one common to its class. Consider, for instance the statement. 'I am conscious'. Here, the property of being conscious is a general quality that exists in all living beings whereas indicates the speaker a person or an individual.

According to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea, this *naigama* is sub-divided into three viz. *vartamana, bhuta* and *bhavisyat* or *bhava*. *Vartamana naigama* belong to the past, yet transferred to present. When we say that today is the *parinirvana* day of Lord Mahavira, we do not mean that the Lord Mahavira is to attain or attaining nirvana on the day we actually so spoke. The event took place many centuries ago on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this correspondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of

the subsequent years. In the *Bhuta naigama* instead of looking back to the past we may look forward to a remote future, instead of detecting in the concrete present the continuity of the past, we may discover in it something which is yet to be. As for example, when on perceiving would be king, we say, 'Here comes His Royal Highness'. It means that he is not yet king now, but is going to be one soon. Similarly, we may speak of every *Bhavyajiva* a good soul as *siddhajiva*, a perfect soul. For somehow in the far off future perfection will be the goal of all; for everyone is God in the germ. Such an assertion is true according to *Bhavanaigam* or future *Naigam*.

(2) *Samgraha*: This standpoint is that which comprehends several different modes under one common head through their belonging to the same class. In other words, it deals with the general characteristic of an object or the class character of a, factual situation. As for example, 'reality is one because it exists' is position of this *naya*. It does not look at the particular properties of reality but regards the general property as its subject matter though there can be no general or universal without particular, yet the enquiring from this standpoint keeps in view the generic qualities only.

This *naya* is of two kinds, *parasangraha* (ultimate class-view) and Apara *Sangraha* (inferior class-view). Every existing thing partakes of the nature of reality. Hence, we may speak of all things as one in the ultimate Reality and it is the example of *Parasangraha naya*. But the different classes of things living and non-living included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes and it is the subject matter of the *Apara-sangraha naya*.

The fallacy of this *naya* occurs when we consider the general property alone as constituting a thing. This kind of fallacious propositions gives rise to confusion of thought, because the general Qualities alone can never constitute an actual object.

(3) *Vyavahara*: This *Naya* means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life. It amounts to knowing things by their call value. It takes into consideration a general object as possessing specific properties. It does not deal with generality as does the *sangraha naya*. On the other hand, it classifies the subject matter of the *sangraha* in the mode of particularity. Examination of the specific *Dravyas. Jiva Dravya* and *Ajiva Dravya*, both belonging to the *Dravya* Genus, would be an illustration of the *vyavahara naya*.

Fallacy of *Vyavahara Naya* lies in wrong selection of species. When the generic correlative of specific feature is entirely ignored the resultant fallacy comes to have only the semblance of this *naya*. Which select, only four primary elements as real, is the best example of this *naya*. This type of fallacy is found in the Indian philosophy.

(4) *Rjusutra*: The argument underlying this standpoint is that of immediate utility which naturally must be grounded upon the present aspect of a thing. It denies all continuity and identity. It is purely momentary. It is important to note here that it does not refer to the past or future of the thing, in this respect it is still narrower than the *vyavaharik* present. At least for *vyavaharik* view there is a tolerable duration; for the present and the conventional things are real so, far. But according to this *naya* a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. Thus, it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Accordingly, when we claim to know a thing; we mean thereby to know it only with reference to its present substantive state (*Dravya*) name (*Nama*) and form. For example, we say, ʿIt is very pleasant nowʾ. This proportion predicates something which is true of the subject only at the moment of the predication.

(5)   The fallacy of this *naya* occur when the permanence of things is altogether denied. Each and every object is taken to be momentary without having any kind of general features in it

(5) *Sabda*: The present stand point of synonyms refers to the function of synonymous words which, despite their differences in tense, case; gender, number and so forth convey the same meaning. In other words, it treats synonymous words as all having, the-same sense. The meaning is that the *sabda-naya* does not concern itself with but simply deals with synonymous as if they were pure equivalents of one another. For instance, *kumbha, kalasa, ghata* are all expressive of one and the same object viz. a Jar. Again, *Jiva, Atman, Prana* etc. are synonymous terms and though these differ from one another in their etymological hearings, yet they all refer to the one and the same thing conventionally.

Fallacy of *Sabadanaya* occurs when we ignore the distinguishing features of it and deal with synonymous words -as absolutely having the same meaning. The *sabdadvaitavadin*s and a few other schools in Indian Philosophy. are said to have corn-̄ mitted this fallacy.

(6) *Samabhirudha*: It is the differentiation of term's according to their roots. The difference in the roots must mean, a corresponding difference in the terms and therefore in their meanings. In other words, it distinguishes the meanings of synonymous word's purely on etymological grounds. For instance, a jar (Kumbha), a pitcher (*kalasa*) and a pot (*ghata*) signify different things according to their meanings. The point is that while the *sabdanaya* would treat synonyms as equivalent words, the *samabhirudha naya* would distinguish them ̄from one another on etymological grounds. Thus, it is only a special application of *sabdha-naya*. In becoming specialized it becomes narrower and more exaggerated than the above *naya*s. The fallacy of this *naya* consists in treating, the synonymous words as having absolutely different meanings.

(7) *Evambhuta*: Etymologically, *evambhuta* means the truth of the word and its sense in its entirety. It calls for a different designation for each of the different attitudes which the same object assumes under different conditions. In other words, it recognizes an object denoted by a word only in respect of its own natural function as suggested by the derivative meaning of that word. Thus, accordingly to this principle, the radical sense in general is not the appropriate sense of a term. Even the root signification must have different gradations and aspects. Of these various aspects and gradations in the manifestations of the thing. Only one particular aspect or gradation is contemplated by the root of a term and it is this contemplated aspect or gradation which is the legitimate meaning of the terms in its current usage. The very same thing in a different attitude must he designated by a different term altogether. For instance, Purandara should be designated as such only when he is actually engaged in the act of destroying his en- emies. Similarly, the designation '*sakra*' is appropriate only when he is actually manifesting his prowess. Thus, Purandara becomes as different from *sakra* as a cow is from a *Jara*.

The fallacy of this *naya* lies in making the existence of a thing absolutely dependent on the performance of the special function with reference to Which a particular name has been

awarded to it.

Thus, each of, the seven *naya*s has a greater extent or denotation than the one which follows it. *Naigama* has thus the greatest and *ebambhuta* the least extent *Naigama* deals with real and unreal. *Samgraha* deals with real only *Vyavahara* with only a part of the real. *Sabda* with only the expression of the real. *Sambiruddha* with only one particular expression. *Evamabhuta* with only that particular expression which applies to the thing in its present activity.

In this connection, it can be noted that there cannot be a thing which is devoid of its modifications of birth and decay. On the other hand, modifications cannot exist without an abiding or eternal something, a permanent, for birth decay and stability-these three constitute the characteristic of a substance or entity. These three characteristics must dwell together in harmony to make a real definition of a thing in its integral form. In this respect each *naya*, therefore, if taken independently isolated from the other, can never yield an adequate idea of an entity. Both these therefore, divorced from each other, are wrong in their standpoints. Therefore, Jaina logicians say that "a man who, holds the view of the cumulative character of truth (*Anekantavada*) never says that a particular view is right or that a particular view is wrong. Again "if all the *naya*s arrange themselves in a proper way and supplement to each other, then alone they are worthy, of being termed as the whole truth or the right view in its entirety. But in this case they merge their individuality in the collective whole". Therefore, the right approach should be to accept the • relating validity of knowledge. In order to give a logical shape to this view the Jainas have formulated; "a theory of relative standpoint" and "they, are of opinion that there can never be an absolute claim about the truth of any expression."

At last, we can say in the words of G.H. Rao that "each philosophy approaching reality form a particular and a partial standpoint, looks upon the one they adopt as the only true standpoint. Jainas reject the idea of the absolute which is playing havoc in the field of philosophy by creating absolute monism, absolute pluralism, and absolute nihilism. By thus rejecting the absolute and one-sided, they claim to save philosophy from the chaos of conflicting opinions. Without partiality to any one they promise to give us a theory of relativity which harmonizes all standpoints."

Notes and References

1. Siddhasena Divakar, SanmatitarkahPrakarana, Gatha- 22-25.

2. Padmarajiah,Y.J. *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 301

3. Jacob, H- Studies in Jainism, p. 17, 52

4. Upadhye, A.N. (ed) *Pravacanasara*, Introduction-LXXXV

5. Padmarajiah, Y.J. *Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge*, p. 304

6. Ibid,. P. 305

7. Pujyapada, *Sarvarthasiddhi, Sutra - 6*

8. *Satkhandagama,* p. 163. Vidyananda, Tattvarthasloka Varttika 1-6.

9. Suri, Vadideva : *Syadvada-ratnakara* vol. IV., p. 44.

10. Vidyananda:*Astasahasri*,p.209

11. do *Tattvarthaslokavarttika*, 1-6

12. Samantabhandra : *Aptamimamsa, Gatha* – 108; Vidyananda : *Astasahasri*, p. 290

13. Tatia, N.: Acarya Bhiksu Commemoration Vol. Sec. III, P. 103

14. *Jayadhavala*, p. 283; *Sthananga - 209*

    There are four distinct phases of the develop meet of the doctrine in the exegetical and logical literature of the *Jnana*s, Viz.

    Niksena as doctrine of verbal usage,

    Nikespa as a doctrine of aspects of reality

    Nama-niksepa as entailing a doctrine of import of words and

    Niksepa as a critique of absolutism.

    Dr. Tatia, Acarya Bhiksu commenoration volume, Sect. III, p. 71

15. Raju, P.T. The philosophical Traditions of India, p. 97

16. Hemachandra : *Anya-yoga-vyavaccheda dvatrimsika*, SU-5, Akalanka *Laghistraya - Tika*-62

17. There are mainly three traditions which are based on the number of *naya*s occurring in the classification adopted by each of them within the framework of reality which is conc e i v e d to be fundamentally *d r a v y a paryayarthika*. The first one adopts a classification of seven, our treatment of the subject has been based on this classification. The second tradition drops ama which is the first among the seven *naya*s recognised by the first tradition. The third tradition reduces the number from seven to five by sub-summing *samabhirudha* and *evambhuta*, the last two standpoints under *sabda*, and thus treating them as two subdivisions of the *sabdanaya*.

    Dr. Padmrajiah, *Jaina Theories of Reality and knowledge*, p. 325

18. Siddhasena Diakara : *Sanmatitarka Prakarana - 1.3.*

19. Suri, Vadideva : *Pramana-naya tattvaloka*, Vol. VII, P.6

20. Ibid., p. 27

21. Vinaya Viaya : *Nayakarnika - Sutra*-5. Akalanka. *Tattvartha-raja vartika* 1/33.

    Suri, Vadideva : *Syadvada-ratnakara*, Vol.V. P.1052

    Prabhacandra *Nayakumudacandra*, p. 84 Vidyananda : *Tattavarthaslokavarttika*, p. 249.

    Samantabhadra : *Laghiyastraya*, p. 39, 68

22. Chakrabarty, A : *Sacred Books of Jainas*, Vol. III. p. C-111.

23. Vinaya-vijaya *: Nayakarnika, Sutra*-6 Pujyapada : *Sarvarthasiddhi*

    Vidyananda *Tattvarthaslokavaratika* p. 270; Akalanka : *Tattvarthavartika, Sutra*. 1/33

24. Vinayavijaya; *Naya Karnika, Sutra* 8; Suri, Vadideva : *Pramana naya tattvaioka* - vol. V11-23-4

25. Ibid.

    Prabhacandra : *Nyayakumudacandra*, p. 636,792

    Samantabhadra : *Laghistraya, Karika* 43,71

26. Vinayavijaya : *Naya Karnika, Sutra* 14 Akalanka : *Tatvarthavaratika* - 1 /33

    Vidyananda : *Tattvarthaslokavartika* p. 272, 273.

27. Siddhasena Divakara: *Nayayavatara* (Ed. P.L. Vaidya), p.82.

28. Vinayavijaya : *Naya Karnika sutra* 15

    Prabhacandra : *Nayakumudacandra* vol. U. p. 638

29. Suri, Vadideva, *Pramananayatattvaloka*, vol. VII. 36

30. Ibid. p. 40

    Vinaya vijaya : *Naya Karnika sutra* 17.18.

31. Sidasena Divakara : *Sanmatitarka, Gatha* 1; 12,13

    Pujyapada: *Sarvartha Siddhi, Sutra* 30

32. Siddhasena Divakara : *Sanmatitarka, Gatha* 1/25,28

33. Pandey, R.C. : *A Panorama of Indian Philosophy*, p. 44

34. Rao, G.H. : The half yearly Journal of the Mysore University (1942) pp. 79-80.

The Relativity of Naya in Jaina Logic

Dr. Brij Kisbore Prasad

I

If things are cognised to have their extramental existence and are not unknowable like the Kantian things-in-themselves, what we know of them is not appearance, but reality. And it is this reality which, according to Jaina thinkers, we are directly in contact with and of which the world as a whole is constituted. For how can anyone disbelieve what the experience testifies? Thus, it would be an utter disregard of one's own living experience as well as the real world if the physical objects are considered as mere 'passing collocations of qualities' and hence 'mere fiction of ignorance' as the Buddhists believe or as mere illusions and the objects of name (*namarupa*) as the *Advaita Vedantins* hold. Like some of the western contemporary realists and empiricists, the Jaina thinkers not only believe in the reality of substance (*dravya*) or objects of sense, but in the fact that objects of sense-perception are the congruous of the 'most contrary qualities of infinite variety'. In view of this, the Jainas consider the nature of 'being' (sat) as a system which "involves a permanent (*dhruva*) accession of some new qualities (*utpada*) and loss of some old qualities (*vyaya*)"1.

On this view, therefore, every object is conceived to be constituted of infinite attributes (dharmas), which are not conceptual in Platonic or Hegelian sense of the western thought, rather they really exist in things and objects of the world. Thus, when we speak of a specific property being possessed by an object, it can always be with respect to a 'specific point of view'. For how can a particular characteristic quality be alone true of a thing in view of the manifold changes due to light and shade when it is seen from different angles by the same observer or by different observers from the same angle? And this necessitates the Jainas to adopt the principle of `naya"—"the different standpoints from which things (though possessed of infinite determinations) can be spoken of as possessing this or that quality or as appearing in relation to this or that." (2)

II

Naya is a form of *Pramana* for achieving the knowledge of reality. As *Pramana* is valid knowledge of the many-faced (*anekanta*) things and objects of cognition, so `naya' is a mode of valid knowledge from some specific point of view directed to apprehend a part or aspect of an objects (3). Since it apprehends a part or an aspect of some real thing to the exclusion of all other aspects, it is a partial knowledge. This may mean that to the extent it is not a complete know-ledge comprising the whole nature of reality, it gives a truncated view of things. This is why when *naya*s are considered as representing the absolute view of reality, they verge on *nayabhasa* or the false view of reality.

Since Jaina metaphysics gives due weight to each of the qualities or attributes which form the life-force of substances (*dravya*s) and by which alone their existence is realised. No substance or object can be thought to have only one quality which may die out in course of time or having no quality at all. It is, therefore, essential that objects must be constituted of such elements or attributes some of which may be permanent and some may be changing. Things and beings, therefore, are to be considered as a synthesis of opposites, such as existence and non-existence, permanent and change, oneness and many-ness, or identity and change, so that from the standpoint of substance *(dravya)*, an object may be thought to be permanent and from the viewpoint of modes *(paryayas)* it may be taken as changing. This is why all assertions with respect to the nature of things can be true only relatively, *i.e.,* from some specific point of view. And this is what *'naya'* aims to fulfil annulling all absolute and *ekantic* view of things which, according to Jainas may be interpreted as smacking of violence *(himsa)* and vitiated with falsehood. Considering the fact that we human beings, subjected to many shortcomings, can have only limited vision of things, we cannot grasp the entire nature of reality all at once. Consequently, the *naya* view of things is the only alternative left. It is a point of view with which the knowing mind works in achieving any knowledge and in this the mind is guided by certain intent or purpose *(samkalpa)*. And because an entity has infinite attributes, 'the Methods (4) are infinite.' "A Method-character belongs to the speaker's intents, which are satisfied with one of the attributes. And to this effect as many as are the ways of statement, just so many are the Method-statements" (5). Here a brief account of the important Method-statements may be fruitful and which will acquaint us with the Jainas penetrating vision of the reality too.

III

Considering the various ways of perceiving an object, the `nayas'`, broadly speaking, are found to be of two types—one concerning substance and the other concerning modes. "That which cognises only substance primarily, is that of substance, and that which cognises only the mode primarily, is that of modes" (6). The first one is called *Dravyanaya.* In cognising an object, it lays emphasis on its substantial part irrespective of the qualitative or modal aspects. The other form of *naya,* called *Paryayanaya,* lays stress upon the qualitative or modal aspects of things ignoring its substantial part.

In this respect, it may be mentioned here that it is the demand of Jainas' ethics of `abstenance from falsehood' *(satyam)* not to conceal one's own shortcomings *i.e.,* even when not being able to cognise the entire aspects of a thing all at once, one should boast of cognising its entire substantial and modal aspects, Hence, the truth demands to embrace the principle of *'naya',* which comes to suggest that a thing from a particular point of view, may be considered as substance *(dravya)* and from that of another, it may be considered as a system of attributes and modes. Besides, this method of apprehending reality also reminds us of Jainas' critical acumen in the field of logic and epistemology.

But the Jaina logician would not rest content only with these two broad distinctions concerning the ways of cognising reality rather they further make a thorough critical analysis of the various viewpoints. And since the phenomenal reality is many-faced *(anantadharma),* so the ways of cognising its nature cannot be one, but many. Hence in accordance with the various aspects of things and beings, various *nayas* have been conceived.

Thus, of the substantial *(dravya) naya,* we can mention three forms—the non-distinguished *(naigamanaya)* the generic *(samgrahanaya)* and the empirical *(vyavaharanaya).* In general, all of them may be classed under *arthanaya,* as they refer to objects or meanings *(artha).* Similarly, the modal aspect *(paryayanaya)* may be classified under four important types—the straight-expressed *(rjusutra),* the verbal *(Sabda),* the subtle *(samabhirudha)* and the such like *(evarmbhuta).* In general, these three may be called *sabdanayas* considering their specific reference to words *(sabda).* Thus, broadly speaking, we have seven forms of *naya—three* coming under the class *dravyanaya'* and four under that of *'paryayanaya'.* A brief discussion of these may be

useful to our purpose, for these also reveal the farsightedness of the Jainas' understanding in the field of epistemology and logic.

I. *Naigamanaya* proceeds on the assumption that since a thing possesses the most general as well as the most special attributes, we may lay stress on either of them at any time and ignore the other. Thus, when I have a 'pen' in my hand and when asked as to whether my hand is empty, **I** may reply in one of the ways that have something in my hand' or 'I have a pen in my hand'. Here in the first case my answer considers the pen in the "widest and most general point of view as a 'thing' or substance" and the alternative answer takes the 'pen' in 'its special existence' as a pen. Thus, it is, according to the Jaina thinkers, the common-sense point of view which considers things as possessed of both generic *(samanya)* and specific *(visesa)* qualities which are not distinguished from one another with the result that, while cognising the nature of things, one may lay stress on either of the qualities.

It may be noted that *'naigamanaya'* goes against the view held by the *Advaita Vedantins* and the Buddhists, for the former deny the specific qualities *(visesa)* found in a thing, while the latter disbelieve in the existence of any generic quality *(samanya)*. But for the Jainas, true to their unifying attitude and the view of *ahimsa,* there cannot be any absolute separation between the generic and the specific or the universal and particular and for that matter even between high and low or rich and poor.

2. The generic *(samgrahanaya)* is the class point of view which looks at things from their 'most general and fundamental aspect'. For instance, we may state that things of the world are mere 'being' thus laying emphasis merely on their most general character as 'being' or `existence' devoid of all specific properties *(visesa)*.

Samgrahanaya *may again be of two types—ultimate *(parasamgraha)* and non-ultimate *(aparasamgraha)* accordingly as the emphasis, in making any statement, is put either on the highest class essence as on 'being' or 'existence' irrespective of the specific features, or the emphasis is laid merely on the inferior class character as when *dharma, adharma, dika* (space), *Kala* (time) etc., considered substantially, are thought to be identical. If things are regarded as belonging merely to either of the classes and the individual characters are ignored, we are liable to commit *parasamgrahnayabhasa* or *aparasamgraha-nayabhasa.*

3.   The empirical standpoint *(vyavaharanaya)* comes to regard the real nature of things from "the point of view of actual practical experience of the thing, which unifies within it some general as well as some special traits"(7). Thus this 'pen' I am writing with has some 'general traits' shared by all pens, but it has some special traits as well. And all these, from the practical point of view, go to make up the essence of this 'pen', and none of these properties can be set apart forming concept of the 'pen'. On this view, therefore, the *naya* becomes empirical, for it remains indifferent to the generic *(samanya)* and specific *(visesa)* features of things.

4.   Of the *parayayanaya* which considers a thing as a conglomeration of qualities and modes, the straight-expressed *(rjusutranaya)* concentrates upon merely that mode of things which is of the present moment irrespective of the past or future characters, *e.g.,* there is the mode of happiness at present. Here emphasis is laid only upon the temporary mode of happiness. The *rjusutra* is the Buddhist way of looking at things which does not believe in the existence of a thing in the past or future, but believes that at each moment there are new qualities in things which form their true essence.

5.   The next modal standpoint is the verbal *(Sabdanaya)* which takes account of words and their meanings. Each word may refer to a particular object or quality and different words may mean the same object. The relation between words and their meanings cannot be absolute, but relative, as the relation is bound to vary in accordance with their use. Thus, in the statements `the mason constructs a house' and 'a house is constructed by the mason', the word 'house' is used in the objective sense in the first instance and in the nominative sense in that of the second one. Thus, the *sabdanaya* is meant to take account of the varying relations between words and their meanings. Contrary to this, if a word is considered to have its fixed meaning irrespective of its varying use, we commit *sabdanayabhasa.*

6. As against the above standpoint which accepts identity in objects even though there is difference in their modes, the *sambhiruddhanaya* takes account of the difference in objects when the modes vary ; that is, it emphasises the literal meaning of words ignoring their identical derived meanings. For example, the words *Indra, sakra* and *Purandara* have the same derivative meanings, *i.e.* king of gods in heaven. But *samabhiruddhanaya* overlooks the identity of meaning of the synonyms and it accepts difference in objects when the modes are different, and in this way it distinguishes one synonym from the other

applying each word for its specific object in accordance with the etymological meaning of the word.

7. Lastly, the such-like or *evambhutanaya* is a special application of *samabhiruddhanaya* and it restricts a word to one particular meaning, which emphasises one particular aspect of an object. For instance, the word `*gau'* literally means a moving animal and so a moving cow should be designated by `*gau'*. But if it is not moving, the animal should not be designated as `*gau'*, but by a different word. This standpoint takes a word in its strict etymological sense, which is applicable to an object "having practical efficiency at the present moment". If this principle is ignored, as the grammarian does, we fall into error called *evambhutanayabhasa.*

Having discussed the important features of some of the *nayas,* we find that in each case the preceding *naya* has a greater extent and applicability than the succeeding ones. Thus, for instance, the *naigamanaya* has the greatest extent, as it is concerned with both real *(bhava)* and unreal *(abhava)* things. Contrary to this *samgrahanaya* refers only to things that are real *(bhava)* and so it has lesser extent, although it has greater extent and applicability than *vyavaharanaya* which deals with only a part of the real, *e.g.,* individual things existing in the past, the present and the future. Again, the latter has greater extent than *rjusutranaya* which is concerned only with the present modes of individual things. In this way each preceding *naya* has greater extent than the succeeding ones.

The above classification and explanation of the *naya*s go to show that there are many ways of looking at things and consequently there are infinite number of *nayas* or points of view. They are, of course, the partial views regarding things and are relative to the different aspects of them. All affirmations whether affirmative or negative are conditioned to time, place and the various circumstances, "Infinite number of affirmations may be made of things from infinite points of view" (8). It is, therefore, suggested by the Jaina logicians that each affirmation should be preceded by the phrase *'syat'* by certain point, which will ensure their correctness and relativity of truth.

IV

Having gone through the chief ways of affirmations called *nayas,* which at one time emphasise the substantial character of things in which qualities and modes

remain merged and at the next moment the modal aspect where qualities and modes alone remain predominant, we find that they have a great practical value. And this centres round the truth that since we human beings cannot transcend our limitations regarding the knowledge of things, we, of necessity, must approach reality with a specific point of view or intent, which "works, of course, by way of thing or by way of word, because there is no other course" (9). And this intent, which indirectly also exposes our inability to cognise things in their entirety, may be termed as pragmatic. It is pragmatic firstly because it enables men to cognise the nature of things, at least from a particular point of view, which may be useful to their purpose. Again, it is pragmatic because this intent to cognise things from a specific point of view has a unique compromising or unifying effect upon the different opposite and contrary view-points, and this may be considered as most useful and commendable for the well-being of men in general.

In this connection, it may further be mentioned that the Jainas' principle of *'naya'*, even to-day in some form or the other, is being practised by some eminent contemporary western thinkers too. For the meaning or importance in our thoughts of objects and things, according to some of them, rests mainly upon the "effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it and what reactions we must prepare"(10). And it is further asserted that "all realities influence our practice and the influence is their meaning"(11). We start from the objects 'already empirically given or presented', and the meaning is the effects these objects produce. This means that if our approach to things be proper and just, as the principle of *naya* aims at, it is bound to prove beneficial and fruitful for us. Truth is relative to human purpose or the intent with which man works.

Further, it would seem quite true that the Jaina logicians were alive to the fact that impressions or sense-data caused by objects experimentally given cannot remain the same for all percipient beings, rather they are bound to differ from individual to individual producing a variegated knowledge of things. As the western pragmatist Dewey remarks: "One does not expect two lumps of wax at different distances from a hot body to be affected exactly alike; the upsetting thing would be if they were. Neither does one expect cast-iron to react exactly as does steel" (12).

It is not surprising that one who holds a view which is partial, as the method of *naya* envisages, and acts accordingly to the effect that he refuses to entertain any absolute

view regarding things, may be accused of being a subjectivist or dogmatist. But when seen from a wider perspective and scientifically judged, the Jainas' logic of approach to things and their points of view *(nayas)* adopted in comprehending the nature of reality can never be condemned as an inconsistent or incoherent method. For no truth and for that matter no view regarding the nature of things and beings can have any value in life unless it gives due importance to each and every aspect of being. And these are what *nayas* aim at. "'If truth thus stands in the service of life, can we refuse to recognise the importance....For are not Science, Morality, Religion, Art, so many different ways of seeking an 'harmonious' and 'satisfactory' life" (13).

Notes and References

1. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, (Cambridge, 1963), p. 175.
2. *Ibid.,* p. 176.
3. *Cf.* "the Jainas restricted the *pramana* to ultimate proof or truth in accordance with their main doctrine of many-sided *(anekanta)* existents. From this they distinguish the *nayas,* `loads', 'lines of approach',"
4. Mallisena, *Syadvadamanjari*, Trans., F.W. Thomas, (Varanasi, 1968,) p. 152 (foot-note). 4.. *Cf.* *'nayas,* 'leads', 'lines of approach' (here rendered 'methods), *Ibid.,* (foot-note).
5. *Ibid.,* p. 154.
6. Yagovijaya Gani. *Jainatarkabhasa*, Trans. Dr. Dayanand Bhargaya, Motilal, Delhi (India), 1973, p. 71.
7. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1963, p. 178.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Mallisena : *Syadvadamanjari*, Trans., F. W. Thomas, Motilal, Delhi (India), 1968, p. 154.
10. William James, *Pragmatism, A New Name for some old ways of Thinking* (Popular Lectures on Philosophy), Longmans, New York, 1907, pp. 46-47.
11. *Ibid.,* p. 48.
12. His essay, *'Logic of Judgments of Practice' in Essays in Experimental Logic*, Dover, New York, 1916, p. 411.
13. R.F. Alfred Hoernle, 'Pragmatism Vs. Absolutism' in *Mind*, Vol. 14, 1905, pp. 299-300

JAIN BHAWAN

Many-valued logic and *syādvāda*

Dr Anupam Jash

In recent times Philosophers have used concepts and techniques of modern western logic to interpret *Syādvāda-saptabhaṅgīnaya* the epistemological from of *anekāntavāda,* which offer a sevenfold mode of predications or judgments. This is a fundamental theory of Jaina philosophy, unavailable in any other system of Indian philosophy. The modern logical concepts and techniques that have been used to understand the ancient Jaina doctrine of *'syāt'* were not available to ancient philosophers of India including the Jainas.

However, in this paper we intend consider mainly the application of many valued logic by S. L. Pandey.

Many-valued logic and *syādvāda*: S. L. Pandey's interpretation

Professor S. L. Pandey in his paper "*Nayavāda and Many-Valued Logic*" tries to understand *nayavāda* and *syādvāda,* which he regards as a species of *nayavāda*, in terms of many-valued logic (1).

S. L. Pandey assimilates the logic of *nayas* with Lukasiewiczian three-valued logic by exploiting the distinction between *pramāṇa*, *naya* and *durnaya (2)*. The first question which S. L. Pandey wants to raise is: 'what is the truth-value of a *naya'*? Pandey consider the remarks of Malliṣeṇa in *Syādavādamañjarī [*"*sadeva sat syātsaditi tridhārtho miyeta durnītinayapramāṇeḥ / Yathārthadarśi tu nayapramāṇapathena durnītipatham tvamāsthaḥ.(3) ―" Syādavādamañjarī*, Verse no. 28.] and claims to following Malliṣeṇa in determining the truth value of a statement. Pandey says: "Malliṣeṇa distinguishes a *naya* from a *pramāṇa* on the one hand and from *durnaya* on the other. According to him a *pramāṇa* is true and a *durnaya* is false. Consequently, the truth value of a *naya* is different from the true and the false and is properly speaking 'indeterminate' or 'indefinite' or a 'third logical value'. The illustration of a *pramāṇa*, *durnaya* and *naya* are respectively (a) *syāt* words are ephemeral, (b) words are

ephemeral only and (c) words are ephemeral. A *naya* is not qualified with any particle (*nipāta*) but a *pramāṇa* is qualified with the particle *'syāt'* and a *durnaya* is qualified with the particle *eva* (or only). The false statement is called *ekāntavāda* or the statement of exclusive predication, while the true statement is called *syādavāda* or the statement of relative predication i.e., a statement under the perspectives of its truth-condition. Finally the unqualified or unmodified statement that is *naya* is ordinary or common sense statement that has a neutral truth-value which may be called the indeterminate truth-value"(4).

From this point of view S.L. Pandey inquires into the nature of this neutral truth value. What sort of a truth value is this? The straight answer to this question, according to him, is that it is an intermediate truth-value i.e., it is a truth-value which lies between truth and falsehood. In other words, the indeterminate truth-value is less true than the true and more true than the false. He therefore thinks that, the Jaina concept of the indeterminate truth-value, thus perfectly accords with the similar concept of Lukasiewicz's concept of indeterminate truth-value.

A question may be raised regarding the grounds for interpreting the indeterminate truth value of *naya* as the indeterminate truth value proposed by Lukasiewicz? This question is extremely relevant and may be disposed of, according to Pandey, on the consideration of following grounds:-

First Argument : Jaina logicians regards a *naya* neither as *pramāṇa* (true statement) nor as *apramāṇa* (false statement) but as approximation to *pramāṇa*. The terms they use are *pramānāṁśa* (aspects of *pramāṇa*) and *pramāṇaika-deśika* (a segment of *pramāṇa*). Both these words signify or presuppose the ontological category of the whole and parts. But Jaina philosophers themselves have made a clear-cut distinction between knowledge and reality (5) ["*pramāṇanayairadhigamaḥ*", 'knowledge is the means and reality is the end'. *Tattvārtha Sūtra*, 1-6, by Umāsvāti]. So the ontological category of the whole and parts cannot be applied, Pandey says, to the epistemic category of truth values or processes like *pramāṇa* and *naya*. *Nayas qua* knowledge differ *ipso facto* from things or real objects. On Pandey's view it is untenable therefore, to maintain that a *naya* is a part or segment of *pramāṇa*. The logical relation between *naya* and *pramāṇa* is based on their truth-values. Consequently, 'aspects of *pramāṇa* or segment of *pramāṇa* are to be understood as approximations to *pramāṇa*. In other words, the truth value of *naya* falls between the true and the false or it is removed from the false and approximates to the true. So, the Jaina concept of the truth-value of *naya* is logically the same as Lukasiewicz's concept of the indeterminate truth-value, Pandey concludes (6).

In this context Pandey, refers to Pandit Kailash Chandra Shastri who has also come to a similar conclusion in his Hindi translation of the *Nayavivaraṇa* portion of Vidyānanda's *Tattvārtha Śloka Vārtika (7)*, for he says that the truth value of *naya* is true from one stand-point and false from another stand-point, i.e., it has two aspects — the aspect of the true and the aspect of the false. Lukasiewicz's concept of the indeterminate truth-value renders the truth-value of *nayas* meaningful. So, Pandey claims that the observation of Pt. Kailash Chandra Shastri is, in all likelihood, indicative of the position held by Lukasiewicz.

Second Argument: As for the second ground, S. L. Pandey cites the views of Akalaṁka and Vidyānanda in support of his view that the intermediate truth-value is to be understood in terms of the concept of probability. He observes that: Both Akalaṁka and Vidyānanda have a clear conception of Probabiity. Vidyānanda, for example, says, while commenting upon the *Aṣṭaśatī* of Akalaṁka that *prāmāṇya* or logical value of every *naya* is a probability value or a mid-way position between truth and falsehood or a position involving both truth and falsehood in various degrees. Prof. Mahendra Kumar Jaina has rightly understood this midway position as probability (8). Again, a *naya* is called *sunaya* or sound *naya* when its truth-value is intrinsic to itself and does not depend on any other *naya (9)*. This means that there are *nayas* and hence *nayavāda* leads to a non-truth-functional many-valued logic of probability. But when the question is raised about the truth-values of only three statements which are respectively true, probable and false, then this logic of probabilities gives rise to a three valued logic. Further the Jainas are conceived this logic as truth-functional also, in as much as they have tried to seek truth-value relations among *nayas*, particularly between the three original *nayas* and the remaining four ones of the *naya saptabhaṅgī* Jaina logic is thus indicative of both a non-truth-functional many-valued logic of probabilities and a truth-functional three valued logic of which one type is the logic of Lukasiewicz. Our main concern, however, is, with the latter (10).

Third Ground: As for the third ground, Pandey cites the view of Mallavādin. He observes that, Mallavādin has designated the three original *nayas* as *vidhi*, *vidhiniyama* and *niyama (11)* which may be understood as the positive, indeterminate and negative statements. What is remarkable in this conception of Mallavādin is the point that he clearly conceived the three truth-values and classified statements according to their truth-values. He placed the indeterminate statement just below the true statement and above the false statement in the scale of decreasing truth-values. This is exactly what Lukasiewicz has done, Pandey concludes (12). Pandey claims, the truth-value of an indeterminate statement, according to Jainism and

Lukasiewicz is more than 'F' and less than 'T'.

Fourth Ground: As for the fourth ground, Pandey observes: Jaina logicians have made a clear distinction between *nayavākya* and *pramāṇavākya* or between *naya saptabhaṅgī* and *pramāṇa saptabhaṅgī*. The former is a table of seven statements each one of which has the truth-value I whereas the latter is a table of seven statements each one of which has the truth-value 'T' or 'I'. Now Jaina logicians have further displayed their correct grasp of three truth-functional operatives, namely negation, disjunction or alternation and conjunction. Negation (*niṣedha* or *pratiṣedha*) may be symbolized as '~', conjunction (*yugapadbhāva*) as '^' and disjunction (*kramabhāva*) as 'v' . Again suppose a statement P has the truth-value 'I'. Now the negation of P is also I. The conjunction of P and ~ P is again I and the disjunction P and ~P, i.e., P v ~P is also I. statement of *naya saptabhaṅgī* are respectively P, ~P, P v ~P and P ^ ~P and each one of them has the truth-value 'I'. The fifth statement is the conjunction of the first and the fourth statements, the sixth statement is the conjunction of the fourth statement and the second statement, and lastly the seventh statement is the conjunction of the fourth statement and the third statement (13). In this way, obviously according to the rule of conjunction the truth-value of all these three compound statements is I. So the table of seven *nayas* is like this:-

1. P where P is I

2. ~P which is I

3. Pv~P which is I

4. P ^ ~P which is I

5. P ^ (P ^ ~P) which is I

6. ~P ^ (P ^ ~P) which is I

7. (P v ~P) ^ (P ^ ~P) which is I (14)

This table becomes logically verified if we maintain that the logic of *nayas* is a three valued logic of Lukasiewicz, Pandey says. Pandey confirms, "Surprisingly enough, the *naya saptabhaṅgī* challenges the law of excluded middle, because here P v ~P which is the classical formulation of the law is not a tautology as its truth-value is 'I' and not 'T'. It further challenges the law of contradiction because here 'P ^ ~P' which is the classical formulation of the law is

not false but I. It assumes that the truth value of a conjunction is the falsest, and that of a disjunction is the truest, of the truth values of its components. Now these epoch-making discoveries of Jaina logicians can be logically, though not historically, linked with the modern developments of three-valued logic" (15).

5.2.   A critical estimate of Pandey's interpretation

(A)   Pandey's main contention, stated as the **first ground**, is that the *nayas* as "approximation to *pramāṇa*" (or true statement) fall "between the true and the false". Therefore, they have a type of truth-value which is logically the same as Lukasiewicz's indeterminate truth-value (16). It may be pointed out that Lukasiewicz does not regard the indeterminate truth-value as "approximation to truth" (17). The indeterminate truth-value belongs to a statement, whose truth-value can not be determine either as true or as false because of the very nature of the statement. It therefore, has a third truth-value.

Ordinarily only two truth-values, namely, Truth and Falsity are admitted to a statement (or a proposition) and classical two-valued logic is based on this idea, so that every statement is either true or false (18).

In the last century Many-valued logic are developed which admit three or more truth-values to a proposition. The pioneering work in this field was inaugurated by J. Lukasiewicz who developed a three-valued logical system (19). He came to the idea that a proposition may have three truth-values from his examination of (Aristotle's problem of) future contingent statements. A future contingent statement is one, which is not necessarily true, nor is it impossible for it to be true. Such a statement may be true or may be false. For instance, 'there is a pen on the table' is a contingent proposition. It will be true if there is a pen on the table, false otherwise. In a future contingent statement, a contingent event is declared to happen in the future. As in Aristotle's example, 'there will be a sea-fight tomorrow'. The occurrence of the sea-fight tomorrow is a contingent matter, the sea-fight may happen tomorrow, it may not happen. Lukasiewicz's point is that as announced today the statement is neither true, nor false. But must have a third truth-value, which is different from truth and falsity (20).

Aristotle's solution to the problem was different. He held that the Law of Excluded Middle, according to which, in its semantic formulation, every proposition is either true or false, did not apply to future contingent statements. The concept of a third truth-value was a great contribution made by Lukasiewicz to logic.

In his paper "*Many-valued Systems of Propositional Logic*" (21), Lukasiewicz had already elaborated this position in this regard: "I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw at a certain moment of next year, e.g., at noon on 21st December, is at the present time determined neither positively nor negatively. Hence, it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition 'I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21st December of next year', can at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary, which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now, on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption. Therefore, the proposition considered at the moment *neither true nor false* and must possess a third value, different from 'o' or falsity and 'l' or truth. This value we can designate by '½'." (22)

It is clear from what Lukasiewicz says that the third truth-value is not an "approximation to true"; nor is it something falling in between truth and falsity. Lukasiewicz also return to this problem in his book "*Aristotle's Syllogistic From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*" where he held the same position with regard to future contingent statements.

(B)   As for Pandey's contention, every *naya* is a probability value or a midway position between truth and falsity or a position involving both truth and falsehood in various degrees (23).

We may point out that the probability of a statement is always relative to the evidence produced and the probability is calculated on the basis of this evidence. For instance, a coin is tossed up and I say 'the coin will turn up Head', the probability of the coin turning up Head is '½' if the evidence produced is that out of ten tosses, 'the coins turned up Heads five times' its probability would be half. But if the evidence produced is that out of hundred tosses, the same coin has turned up Heads thirty-five times then its probability of the statement would be 35/100, and *relative to the evidence, the probability statements are correct or true.*

So, we see that a probability statement does not always occupy 'a midway position' between truth and falsity or 'a position involving both truth and falsehood in various degrees'.

The Jaina philosophers have not raised the question of an evidence when they talk about *naya*. They only consider certain point of view or aspects from which something is viewed (24). Points of view or aspects etc. cannot be regarded as evidence adduced in support of a

statements, probable or otherwise.

(C) As a third reason in support of his view Pandey refers to Mallavādin, who, according to Pandey, has designated the three *nayas* of the Jaina — *vidhi*, *vidhiniyama* and *niyama*, as original, which may be, understood in his opinion, as the positive, indeterminate, and negative statements.

A reading on Mallavādin *'Dvādaśāranayacakra'* reveals no such three *nayas* as *original*. If we are to regard the *nayas* as original on Mallavādin's view they should be *vidhi* and *niyama*. The other as we can see, would be arise out of the combinations and repetitions of this two. Mallavādin fixes up twelve *nayas* in his *'Dvādaśāranayacakra'* which are as follows:-

1. *vidhi*

2. *vidhervidhi*

3. *vidhervidhiśca niyamaśca*

4. *vidherniyama*

5. *vidhiśca niyamaśca*

6. *vidhi niyamaurvidhi*

7. *vhiniyamarvidhiniyama*

8. *vidhiniyamau-niyama*

9. *niyamaḥ*

10. *niyamasca-vidhi*

11. *niyamasya-vidhiniyamau*

12. *niyamasya-niyamaḥ (25)*

But he does not stop here. According to Mallavādin every *naya* is defective that is why he goes on to a next *naya* to overcome the defect which again turns out to be defective. So, he is not satisfied with the list of the twelve *nayas*. He says that he again starts from the first and goes on in a circle or a *cakra*. This process goes on (26). His aim is to show that we cannot get a total view of reality but only get a certain aspect or partial view. However, painstaking efforts you may take, you do not get a total view of reality, by piecing together different points of view

or aspects.

Contrary to Pandey's view, Lukasiewicz does not conceive of the indeterminate statement (or truth-value) 'just below the true statement and above the false statement in the scale of decreasing the truth-value'. There is no trace of such a thing in Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic.

(D) A *naya*, as we have explained, in the preceding chapter, is a partial statement and does not express the whole truth. This is not the same thing as to say that a *naya* is indeterminate. A *naya* expresses a truth although partial (27). An indeterminate statement is neither true nor false. A *naya* expresses a truth however, truncated. But an indeterminate statement does nothing of this kind. So, the basic assumption about *naya* from which Pandey starts, seems to be based on a mistake. And, therefore his whole construction of *naya-saptabhaṅgī* in terms of the three-valued logic totters.

Now let us look at its construction. *Vidhirvidhiśca niyamaśca* is the third *bhaṅga* in the scheme of *naya*. According to the Jaina logicians this is *'krama-vidhi-pratiṣedha-kalpanā'* (or *astināsti ca*). The Jaina logicians make it clear that a *kramabhāva* means successiveness ---- something is viewed from a certain point of view and then from a different point of view. So, both are there, one coming after another (28). Let us try to make the point clear.

By considering a proposition 'there is a pen on the table', the *kramabhāva* yields too different proposition 'in this part of the table there is a pen' and in 'other part of the table there is no pen'. The former may be symbolize by 'p' , the latter by 'q'. So the third *bhaṅga* should be symbolized that 'p . q' instead of 'p v ~q'.

Disjunction or alternation can nowhere be found in *kramabhāva*, which means, both in this case, one after the other. This meaning can be accommodated by using conjunction in the way we have just shown.

In support of the fourth *bhaṅga*, Pandey says, 'p ^ ~p' is the 'classical formulation' of the law of Contradiction. Such a formulation of the law of contradiction cannot be found in western logic. The classical formulation of this law is stated as '~(p.~p)' (29). So, the question of Pandey's interpretation of the fourth *bhaṅga* challenging the classical law of contradiction does not arise at all. It is obvious that Pandey's argument is based on a grave mistake.

Moreover, the ground for his interpretation posing a challenge to the classical law of

contradiction is that, it turns out I (indeterminate) and not F (false) on his interpretation. All the laws of logic are tautologous or logically true (30) and can never turn out false. It will have been very strange indeed the law of contradiction were false, as Pandey seems to thinks. How can anything be called a law in logic or, for that matter, in any science, if it is false?

Let us now consider Pandey's interpretation of *pramāṇa- saptabhaṅgī*. Every statement of *pramāṇa- saptabhaṅgī* is prefaced by *'syāt' (31)*. Now according to Pandey, 'syāt is a semantic qualifier . But it also includes the syntactic quantifier, and may be understood in the sense of the Existential quantifier, as statements qualified by *syāt* are particular statements and not universal statements' (32).

What Pandey says here lacks clarity. Pandey does not explain the difference between *syāt's* being a semantic qualifier and also including a syntactic quantifier, in the sense of the existential quantifier. Now, since he brings in the existential quantifier, the question is pertinent as to what variables the quantifier binds and what predicate the variables attach too. Until the existential quantifier is brought to the force, for the proposition "*syāt* cows are white" and the full quantificational form of the proposition is stated clearly, his interpretation suffers from the defect of unclarity and this infects the whole construction of his *pramāṇa- saptabhaṅgī* — making it, it seems to us, unworthy of profitable use.

It should be remembered that, a proposition may contain several quantifiers (33). Pandey's existential quantifier 'concealed' in the '*syāt*' in the prenex position may bind a variable attached to a predicate different from 'cow' and 'white', and may leave the universality of 'all cows are white' intact which would require a universal quantifier.

It may appear to us that in his argument Pandey assumes that the existential quantifier, produced by *'syāt'* in *'syāt* all cows are white' binds a variable attached to the predicates 'cow' and 'white' turning the proposition 'all cows are white' into 'some cows are white'. The negation of 'all cows are white' is 'some cows are not white'. Now, 'some cows are not white' is itself an existential proposition and has already a quantifier and a variable attached to 'cow' and 'white' which, with the aid of the negation sign '~', is sufficient to take care of it. Then what is the function of the existential quantifier produced by *'syāt* all cows are not white' (logically equivalent to *'syāt* some cows are not white') in the second *bhaṅga*? It would have no function there and remain idle, which is logically an unacceptable position.

Now we come to the fourth *bhaṅga - 'syāt* all cows are white and all cows are not white'

(*syāt avaktavya*) in which the *syāt* produces only one existential quantifier. The trouble here is that the two proposition conjoined by 'and', in this particular instance, requires two quantifiers and the one quantifier the *'syāt'* produces cannot do duty for both. So, we have to use another existential quantifier for the second conjunct 'all cows are not white'.

So the full quantificational formulation of the fourth *bhaṅga 'syāt* all cows are white and all cows are not white' is as follows:

(∃x) (x is a cow and x is white) and (∃y) (y is a cow and y is not white).

Now the whole conjunction is a true proposition and there is nothing expressible or indescribable or *avaktavya* about it. The two conjuncts can be asserted simultaneously conjoined by and without any fear of contradiction or inexpressibility or indescribability. So Pandey's interpretation of *'syāt'* fails to do justice to the fourth *bhaṅga* and takes the *avaktavya* element completely out of the Jaina *Syādvāda*.

What happens if the proposition in question prefaced by *syāt* is a singular proposition like 'Malliṣeṇa is a philosopher'. The *'syāt'* in *'Syāt* Malliṣeṇa is a philosopher' produces, on Pandey's interpretation, an existential quantifier which has nothing to do in this case, for a singular proposition like the one above, does not require the services of any quantifier at all (34). This is also a logically intolerable situation.

So Pandey's interpretation of *pramāṇa-saptabhaṅgī* seems to be deeply flawed.

References

1. Pandey, S. L. *Nayavāda and Many-Valued Logic*, in *Studies in Jainism*, Ed. by M.P. Marathe, M.A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale, IPQ Publication, Poona University, Poona, 1984, p.157.

2. Pandey, S. L. *Nayavāda and Many-Valued Logic*, in *Studies in Jainism*, Ed. by M.P. Marathe, M.A. Kelkar and P. P. Gokhale, IPQ Publication, Poona University, Poona, 1984, p.157.

3. Dhruva, A. B.(ed.) *Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa*, Akshaya Prakashan New Delhi, 2008, verse no.28.

4. Pandey, S. L. op.cit., p.157.

5. *Tattvārthasūtra* verse- 1-6, in *Umāsvāti's Tattvārthasūtra That Which Is*, Nathamal Tatia, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 2007.

6. Pandey, op.cit, p.157.

7. Vide *Dravyasvabhāva Prakāśaka Naya Cakra* of *Mallidhavala*, ed. and tr. in Hindi by Pt. Kailash Chandra Shastri, Bharatiya Jnanapeetha Prakashan, Varanasi, 1971, Appendix-2, p.232.

8. *Prakriyā Sthiti*, vide *Siddhiviniścaya Tikā, Prastāvanā*, by Prof. M.K.Jain as quoted in *Studies in Jainism*, IPQ Publication, Poona University, Poona, 1984, p.164.

9. Vide *Naya Rahasya Prakaraṇa* of Yasovijaya with *Pramodāvivṛti*, pp7-8, Also see Devasuri's definition of *Naya* in *Syādvādaratnākara* and comments on it by Ratnaprabhāsuri.

10. Pandey, S. L. op.cit., pp.158-159

11. *The Dvādaśāranayacakra of Mallavādin Kṣamaśramaṇa*, ed. by Acharya Vijaya Labdhi Suri, Sri Labdhi Suriswar Jain Granthamama, Vadodara, 1948,Vol.-I, p.9.

12. Pandey, S. L. op.cit., p.159.

13. Ibid., p.159-160.

14. Ibid., p.160.

15. Ibid., p.160.

16. Ibid., p.158.

17. See, Lukasiewicz, Jan. *Aristotle's syllogistic From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1957, p.166.

18. Copi, Irving M. *Introduction to Logic*, Ninth Edition, Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2000, P.325.

19. Rescher, Nicholas. *Many-valued Logic*, Mc Graw-Hill Book Company, New Yor, 1969, P.7.

20. Lukasiewicz, Jan. *Aristotle's syllogistic From the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, 1957, p.166.

21. First published in 1930, and later included in Mc Call, S. *Polish Logic*, Oxford University Press, 1967.

22. Haack, Susan. *Deviant Logic Some Philosophical issues*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1977. p.-74

23. Pandey, S. L. op.cit., p.158.

24. Bhattacharya, Harisatya, *Anekāntavāda*, Shree Jaina Atmanand Sabha, Bhavnagar, 1953, p.41.

25. *The Dvādaśāranayacakram of Sri Mallavādi Kṣamaśramaṇa*, ed. by Acrya Vijay Labdhi Suri, Labdhi Suriswar Jain Granthamala, Baroda, 1948., p.10.

26. Ibid., p.310.

27. Dhruva, A. B. (ed.) *Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa*, Akshaya Prakashan, Delhi, 2005, See Introduction, P.cxxii.

28. Dhruva, A. B. (ed.) *Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa*, Akshaya Prakashan, Delhi, 2005, See Notes, P.244.

29. Cook, R. T. *A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic*, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p.169.

30. Copi, Irving M. *Introduction to Logic*, Ninth Edition, Prentice Hall of India Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 2000, P.372-374.

31. Shastri, D. M. *A Source Book in Jaina Philosophy*, Shri Tarak Guru Jaina Granthalaya, Udaipur, 1983, P.279.

32. S. L. Pandey *Nayavāda and Many-valued Logic* in *Studies in Jainism*, Poona University, 1984, p.162.

33. Cook, R. T. op.cit., p.236-237.

34. See, Copi, I. M. *Symbolic Logic*, 4th ed. Macmillan Publishing Co., New York, 1973, p.64-66.